


6A1116



E
2064
2000

KV 4/3





POL. F.

VOLUME 3

HISTORY OF THE SECURITY SERVICE, ITS PROBLEMS &
ORGANISATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS 1908 - 1945, AND
ARRANGEMENTS FOR ITS COMPILATION - THE



POL-50-24-44/V3

See

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date
DEG	-0 JAN 1992	214	27/5	27 FEB 95		B110	12.6.95	
PA	2661 273.10					pld	H1E11	
PA			R01	31 MAR 1995				
RT			H1E3	31 MAR 1995				
REF	15 NOV 1993		H1E11					
H1E11	15 NOV 1993							
27/5	27 FEB 1995							


SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

[illegible]

FILE HELD BY

41E

POL. F.50 - 114 - 4



TOP SECRET

254

THE SECURITY SERVICE

ITS PROBLEMS AND ORGANISATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS


1908-1945

VOL. III. (CHAPTER V., PARTS 2-4 AND APPENDICES)

MARCH 1946

VOL. III.

THE SECURITY SERVICE



24

Mr. Cury

Very well. If it is not
 in Ruskin's phrase a book
 for "all time", equally
 it is not a book of "the
 hour". So it is worth
 while making a job
 of it. But I must re-
 peal my warning
 against its becoming
 unduly bulky.

D. P. C.

8.2.46.

25.

March 1946	Vol.1. (Chapters I to IV) - The Security Service - its problems & adjustments. - 1908 - 1945	25z
"	Vol.2. (" V., Part I) " " " " " " " "	25y
"	Vol.3. (" V, Parts 2 - 4 & Appendices) " " " " " "	25x

D.G.

The completed history is considerably longer than I had intended it to be. This is mainly due to the fact that as late as October 1945 I had no idea of the quantity of material I was going to receive from the sections or of the significance of much of the detail. I had not enough material to enable me to make a satisfactory start on the Chapter dealing with the development of the various sections during the war (Chapter V) until about the beginning of that month and many of the more important sectional histories did not come in until December or January, and even February 1946.

It has proved a far from easy matter to write this book while the material was coming in and therefore, to some extent, uncertain of its nature and extent, and as a result of doing so I have had considerable difficulty in adjusting the perspectives as I went along.

As they came in I found that nearly every one of the sectional histories was full of facts with which, in many cases, I had only a slight or incomplete previous

[P.T. Over.]

acquaintance, but on reading them I realised that it was necessary to set them out fairly fully if I was to give an adequate idea of the part played by the different sections and to give an account on the lines laid down in your minute 20 above. I could not have attempted the 'verdict' for which you asked me, unless I had set out the evidence as fully as I have done.

The sectional histories run to an aggregate of about 1,000,000 words. I have compressed this into about 80,000/90,000 words in Chapter V dealing with the period after the re-organisation of 1941. I have also had to add a few thousand words and alter a few thousand more in my original drafts of Chapters III and IV. The material for some of the key sections did not reach me until the last three months, and D.A., D.B., and D.D.B. have not written any general account of their own work of construction and co-ordination which might have made it easier to see these important Divisions as a whole, but they have helped me with advice, suggestions and some notes. D.C. & D. also gave me some notes and the account of his Division which he prepared for Sir Findlater Stewart. (I should mention that I did not ask them to do more as I saw how difficult, in all the circumstances, it would be for them to do so).

This record of 37 years work connected with the problems presented to us by Germany and Russia in the course of the revolutionary changes in that period is, perhaps, too long in some respects for the purpose you had in view. It is about 150,000 words (or much the same length as Masterman's account of one section (B.I.A.) if his appendices are included). Even so, it is in some respects sketchy or inadequate.

I do not think it will be too long to give your successors a general idea of the nature and work of the Security Service and I have some hope that it will have wider uses for purposes of reference and instruction for the permanent staff of the future. I have found nearly all the sectional histories both interesting and instructive to study.

I regard this report as a first attempt at assembling the raw material. On the basis of this raw material it should be easy to write a short history for circulation outside the office if that is desirable. It also, perhaps, offers possible starting points for the examination of various subjects affecting the organisation of the Security Service under the conditions of peace and war. Some instances are:

- (1) the problem of dealing with the flood of paper which has accompanied the outbreak of both wars and materially contributed in both cases to an early breakdown of the organisation,
- (2) the general problem of preventive measures,
- (3) the desirability of attempting an exhaustive investigation in such fields as the machine tool industry or the detecting of illicit wireless (by means of "general Search") and in a large variety of subjects where opportunities for espionage by foreign or enemy powers present themselves, and

② Ch IV for
1939-40 is
perhaps too
controversial
for this purpose.

(4) all the major problems of organisation, administration, personnel, liaison with other Intelligence Services, relations with Dominions, Colonies and India, and our place in the machinery of Government.

In your minute 20 above you desired me to attempt a verdict whether in their final forms the parts of the machine are the best that could be devised or whether they disclosed defects which should be avoided if ever they had to be built up afresh. As this is a question of personal opinion I have dealt with it separately and have not included it in the record of facts.

I have, however, set down at the end of this report the general principles which I believe to be applicable in the creative work of building up and maintaining in good order an organisation such as this. Stated on these broad lines they will no doubt receive general consent, but there may be differences of opinion and of method when it comes to their practical application. I have included them because they are the conclusions to which I have come as a result of the study of all this material and I think that they are relevant for the purposes of the immediate future.

As the present draft is somewhat untidy I am having a fair copy made. I have not quite completed the revision necessitated by some of the late contributions.

J.C. Curry.
24/3.

I attach an informal note on some of the difficulties in writing this history.

26

Mr. Curry.

I am very glad to have seen your minute and informal note before we have our next discussion. I have certainly never underrated the difficulties of compiling this book, while I have always thought it was worth taking time over (Minute 24). The thing that still worries me about it is its length, for people in these days find it very hard to cope with very lengthy documents. The tempo of official life is not likely to get any slower in the years to come.

It may be that I have not kept in sufficiently close touch with you to give you my views stage by stage. I certainly never intended that any very great part of the book should be devoted to past history. Indeed my idea was that no more would be required than what would serve as an introduction to what we did from 1939 throughout

the recent war. The history of that period still seems to me to fall under 3 heads, what were the tasks confronting us, how we attempted to do them, and how well or ill we succeeded. This, it seemed to me, ought to be the real, live part of the book. Too much of a past that is now remote can help but little with useful lessons. It was a reproach levelled against our Army that in 1914 it was perfectly trained and equipped to fight the Boer War, and in 1939 to fight the first World War. The same tendencies may beset a counter-intelligence organisation.

I have not seen Chapter IV, my only knowledge of it coming from Brigadier Harker. But most emphatically we do not want controversial matter, especially of a doctrinal nature. The verdict I had in mind was not a personal one, either yours or mine or anyone else's. What we need to aim at is the verdict of facts, i.e. the measure of success we attained. If our organisation and methods succeeded, that is far more to the point than what any one may have thought of them. But it is important to inquire, in the case of indifferent success, or actual failure, what were the defects that may have been accountable for them.

D.G.
29.3.46.

D. P. Harker

27.

I have now read through Mr. Curry's Chapters I to V and am thus in a better position to do what he asks, namely to judge them as a whole. I shall endeavour to make this "judgement" something of a review and pointer to indicate the lines on which I think the work needs to be revised and rearranged so that it may serve better the basic purpose of its compilation.

Looking at the length of the book, I am conscious that I have perhaps not kept in close enough touch with Mr. Curry during the time he has been at work. Certainly, the book has run to far greater length than I considered suitable for it in its final form. In my minute of 6.2.45 I said that if the book were to be of maximum use in future, it would be "something comparatively brief, which the head of the Service could himself quickly assimilate and put in the hands of his superior organising officers". It was my idea that the book might be of special value at a time of emergency and rapid expansion such as faced us in 1939. In discussion with Mr. Curry I cited Major Gwyer's manual on "The German Secret Service" as an excellent model to copy, being brief, lucid and containing all that matters and little that does not.

Mr. Curry's book as now completed has far outrun the limits I originally set for it. That I regard as no fault of his, for I have always foreseen (minute of 6.2.45) the difficulty he would have in handling, by the processes of selection and compression, the vast mass of material that would be shot at him. In the end he has done very creditably in producing something of such relatively small bulk as compared with what was collected for him; and it well may be an advantage to have and preserve this fuller history for purposes of record, and as a book of reference. It is not suitable for printing or for any wider circulation.

I must now attempt to indicate what I think needs to be done towards reducing the book to something like the limits originally conceived for it, while not robbing it of its instructional value for the future. The standpoint taken must be a strictly practical one. One cannot do better than quote Mr. Curry's own words: "The object in view is to put on record for future use an account of the experience gained, of the problems which presented themselves, of the machinery devised to deal with them and of the measure of success or failure obtained in practical working".

In my view the whole of Chapter I might with advantage be omitted. I feel that only a very modest amount of past history is "really necessary". Also some of the general views developed, though sound and unimpeachable, could be more fittingly included in a lecture than in such a manual as we aim at producing. I would say the tale might well be taken up as from Part I. of Chapter II, and then proceed on the lines of the introductory part of the Stewart report; though it needs to be told at considerably greater length.

/From

From that point I would go on to deal with Organisation, giving the rise in figures during the first world war, the slump in the in-between years and the expansion that followed the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. That, in my opinion, would be the correct place to introduce the re-organisation of 1941. I would not pause either to investigate or to bewail shortcomings and deficiencies in the pre-war years. Everything had been cut to the bone and perhaps we were just as well off for Intelligence as we were for guns, ships, or airplanes. Then I find an immense amount of material in Chapter IV that had far better be omitted. In ten or fifteen years time, it will really matter very little what A. B. or C. felt or thought about changes, but it will matter to know the shape of the post-organisation machine that emerged, and the part each component was designed to play while revolving in unison with the whole. There is also a lot about Lord Hankey's report that is not worth retailing. He was not a trained Intelligence officer and his report was largely descriptive, even if too approving. He could not be expected to cut very deep, and it was perhaps as much as could be expected from anyone, indifferently equipped. Then there is a good deal about "Lord Swinton's Re-organisation." Actually Lord Swinton did little until after my report, which Mr. Curry has not seen. It was completely independent, for I refused outright to take charge until I had examined things for myself. What I adopted I did because I approved thereof, but I did not approve of the W. Division and soon re-organised it out of existence. And I got the principle of the D.G. being master in his own house recognised and endorsed. Similarly with the Registry. The basic "mechanical" idea was not the patent of Mr. Horrocks, or of me or of anyone else, and I had anyhow tried out that system in India. Mr. Horrocks deserves the fullest credit for perfecting the machine, but various other things, such as making officers responsible for carding and speeding up the connecting of papers, were introduced at my instance. If such things are worth mentioning at all, and I hardly think they are, they had better be correctly stated. Again I would concentrate on what finally emerged. Here, at least, Mr. Curry makes some pregnant remarks on the causes of the breakdown in the shape of a sudden glut of work, since that is a danger that will have to be carefully guarded against in the future. I would prefer, therefore, that the story of the re-organisation should be told through to its end. In the book it seems to be dropped and taken up again without any very obvious reason. It keeps cropping up even in Chapter V, and, being disjointed, suffers in the matter of continuity and clarity. But I must make it clear also that, after re-organisation was completed and as the struggle with the German S.S. developed, special machinery, such as the B.I.A. agents, the L.R.C. Index, the ISOS Index, etc., had to be created and developed. Such could not be fittingly included in the general organisational picture. But they would fit well into the narrative of the general history of the stages of the campaign as waged, all of which Mr. Curry has at his finger tips.

The next section or chapter should deal with the risks confronting us, as these were seen, at the outbreak of war, the German situation, the Russian situation, Communism, Fascism, the Eire situation, etc., and thereafter would come the narrative of the actual measures taken and the success achieved in countering and defeating them. There are plenty of individual cases in Mr. Curry's chronicle that could readily be fitted in here.

/Then

Then would come the summing-up and the pronouncement of judgement. This, one would fancy, would have already been read in the previous accounts of operations on the various fronts of our activity. Then would follow the lessons for the future, and of these Mr. Curry has, in my view, successfully enumerated some of great importance and cogency. The foremost is the risk of the Registry being swamped on the outbreak of the next war with a flood of references, demands for look-up, etc., quite beyond its capacity to handle. Another is the need of a good skeleton staff-in-being for port and travel control, which is something that may have to spring into being overnight and be ready to function efficiently next morning. A third is the need to have people ready to deal with alarmist rumours about wireless, lights, pigeons and so on; in fact all the scare stories that are bound to descend like a flood. Such material must be kept away from and not allowed to clog the wheels of the real counter-intelligence machinery. Another safeguard would be readiness to revive at a moment's notice full relations with the Police up and down the country, as was done by the Regional Liaison Officers. All these points, to which Mr. Curry so rightly draws attention, are those very ones at which special stress is bound to be felt acutely and suddenly. To sum up, there should be breakdown squads ready to take the "shock" which will be sudden and severe.

A further important lesson derives from matters of wider than domestic concern. It relates to the distribution of ISOS material and other intercepts of a similar nature and origin. Much has been said by Mr. Curry about the shortcomings of Section V, and in particular he has castigated the officer who was at the head of it at all material times during actual hostilities. All this, in my view, had far better be forgotten and omitted from our manual for reasons other than those of space. The personal aspects are of no lasting interest or value, however true it may be, as it is, that the outlook of this particular officer was neither wide nor catholic. What it is essential to lay down, as objectively and as firmly as possible, is what in fact were the disabilities imposed on us, and consequently on our work, from this grudging and inadequate sharing of this vital material. This is what needs to be clearly pointed out, so that it may be remedied now and avoided for the future. Any part or parts dealing with future organisation and functions should be omitted, since all this has already been determined by Sir Findlater Stewart, whose recommendations will be embodied in a new directive.

There are sundry other matters I could touch on, but perhaps I have already said enough if I have made clear the general lines on which I consider re-arrangement and compression should be carried out. I am hopeful that any deficiencies can readily be bridged in discussion.

Last of all, I wish to declare expressly that I have indulged in no criticism for criticism's sake. My whole end and aim has been to ensure that our manual should fulfil in the highest possible degree the purpose for which we have designed it. As affecting the future, its importance transcends all other considerations. Mr. Curry has already performed a task of herculean dimensions,

and his completed treatise, after some trimming, should serve as a valuable book of reference for those who may have occasion to consult it. He has now all his material collected and ready to his hand. I am well assured that, in the end, his manual, when it appears, will be of lasting value and will pay a handsome dividend on the great care and industry expended on its production.

According to the rough estimate given me, the book, as it now stands, runs to about 120,000 words. Major Gwyer's manual ran to 40,000 or thereby. In my opinion 50,000 ought to be the absolute ceiling for the new manual.

D.G.
13.4.46

D. Petrie.

28.

29.7.46.

Note on Completion of the "History".

28a

29.

D.G.

The completed history is attached. As instructed by the D.D.G. there is only one copy (except for an unbound carbon copy held by me). I suggest that this may be circulated as follows:- D.D.G., D.A., D.B., D/C & D, D.D.B., A.D.F., A.D.B., D.D.O.

As noted at the beginning it is solely intended for the use of the Directorate and should not be available to anyone else without special permission. The question has therefore to be decided where it is to be kept. Some of the sectional records in this same series (S.F.50-24-44) have been treated as Y Box files with restricted circulation. Possibly D.D.O. can arrange for this to be treated on similar lines or make some special arrangement for it.

8th August 1946.

J.C.
J.C. Curry.

J.C.
J.C. Curry.

30

*Since it should be circulated as
you suggest. With a view to its
being kept safe. Keeping*

8/8/46

12.

31.

22.6.49. Draft letter to Professor Butler, Cabinet Offices,
re History of Security Service.

31a.

32.

*Copied to: P.O.F. 53-24-29.*D.G., through D.D.G.

Mr. J.B. Collier of the Historical Section of the Cabinet Offices came to see me recently to ask whether we could supply a history of the Security Service to be retained in his section for reference.

The only history we possess which would meet their requirements is Mr. Curry's work "The Security Service, Its Problems and Organisational Adjustments, 1908 - 1945", which is the subject of this file. As you know, this work was produced for internal reference only and, so far as I know, has been seen by no-one outside the Service with the exception of Sir Findlater Stewart who was, I believe, shown two chapters in draft at the time of his enquiry into the functions of this Service and of S.I.S. We only possess two copies of this work and, in any case, I am sure you would not allow it to go outside this office.

Would you be willing for a member of the Historical Section - either Mr. Collier or perhaps Mr. Gwyer, as he has been a member of this office - to be given access to this book and to some of the fuller sectional notes which were produced as basic material for the book? It is my opinion that these sectional notes might be more appropriate than the main book for, while they contain the detailed information of interest to the Cabinet Office, I do not suppose they enter into detailed discussion on organisational matters to the same extent.

There is also the point that the book contains references to material the product of other intelligence organisations - e.g. material from Travis' organisation.

I have drafted a letter for you to send to Professor Butler, head of the Historical Section, (31a), but you may wish to consider further the desirability of allowing anyone outside this Service access to a work which is such a full account of all aspects of this Service and its relations with other departments.

D.B.
22.6.49.

D.G. White.

12.58
 D.G. on return.
 D.G.W. 25/7
 D.B.

Copied to: B.F.S. 24/23.

I saw Mr. Collier of the Historical Section of the Cabinet Offices on 20.7.49. He is anxious to include something about the work of the Security Service in his work on the defence of the U.K.

I explained to him that it would be difficult to do this and make sense without telling the whole story. I had found this same difficulty in lecturing to the I.D.C. and had eventually obtained permission to "take the lid off" completely. I then gave him a brief outline of what had happened. The basic factor was that we had succeeded in running the German Intelligence Service in this country from the outbreak of war until the armistice, and that this, coupled with security measures which gave the outward appearance of being 100% - but were in fact only about 25% - had enabled us to keep this country clean of enemy agents and to provide an important weapon for deception in the Battle of Normandy.

Collier had been sceptical at the outset about our desire to avoid any publicity, but on hearing this he readily agreed with me that any mention of our organisation, if it were to be consistent with security, could only be misleading.

I said that if there were any points within our field which were troubling him, either Dick White or myself would be very ready to give him the necessary background, if it were in our power to do so. This might, in certain respects, save him from doing a lot of unnecessary work.

I told him that he was perfectly at liberty to discuss this problem with John Gwyer, and that he could tell Professor Butler that he had satisfied himself that an account of the work of the Security Service in the history of the war could only be made by the disclosure of vital information. If Professor Butler needed to be satisfied on this point, he could refer him to me.

G. L.

D.D.G.
 23.7.49.

12.8.56. R.8. note re address of M.I.5.A in 1917

34a

22.11.62. D.D.G. Minute

35a

26.11.62. From Min. of Aviation enc. pre-war letters from the *S. H.C.* Service 36a

28a

Note on completion of the "History".

As the structure of this history is unorthodox - there are five chapters, the last of which is considerably longer than the other four taken together - I would like the following explanation of the circumstances to be on record.

Briefly, when I planned the book in December 1944 in five chapters I intended that chapters II, III, IV and V should all be roughly (within twenty-five percent or so) of the same length, but I did not receive a large proportion of the material about the Hitler war period until November, December 1945 and January 1946, and before I had seen it all I had little or no opportunity to appreciate the amount of detail and the significance of much of that detail. A considerable part of the book had to be rewritten early in 1946 in view of this material; but it was then too late to recast Chapter V. Originally - by the end of May 1945 - I had made a preliminary draft of Chapters I to IV and what I expected to be the most important - and the larger - part of chapter V, i.e. Part 1 to the end of (iv) A.

The reason for these unsatisfactory conditions was that Sir David Petrie, having made my return from S.I.S. at the end of 1944 inevitable, directed me to start writing the history then, but throughout the next twelve months held to his decision that the Divisions and Sections could not be ordered to produce their material on the ground that their current work must take precedence. In the middle of 1945, in answer to one of my requests for material, he instructed me to write the history without waiting for this material. This proved impossible and I took leave during the greater part of July, August and September as I was unable to proceed with the work. Some material came in during September and October, but not for the most part 'key' material, which came in during the following three months.

It is obvious that for the sake of efficiency and convenience the history should not have been started until the war was over and all sectional material was ready. Sir David Petrie had, however, been anxious for me to start it in 1941 and after this proved not to be a workable proposition insisted, when I went to S.I.S., that I should continue to do my work here in addition to that of Section IX: and that he should have the right to recall me at any time. All these circumstances made the business of writing the history in a satisfactory form in 1945-46 one of considerable difficulty or awkwardness, and I think it is fair that I should set out the facts, as they appear to me, by way of an apologia - not for the matter but for the form or structure of the book which, owing to its length, has had to be made up in three volumes.

As mentioned above the length is greater than was intended. Any attempt to describe the important work done during 1941-45 more briefly would be inadequate; and unfair to the numerous officers - men and women - in the various Divisions who contributed to a great achievement. Some of them have been mentioned by name. This may in some cases appear to involve invidiousness, so it should be made clear that I had no intention of attempting to assess the work of individuals. Officers have been mentioned by name because they were associated with a particular piece of work (nearly always constructive work). In the earlier chapters names are not, as a rule, mentioned. The nature of the organisation during 1941-45 was such that it is not easy to write a readable account of the work as it was done without mentioning the names of those who initiated, developed or controlled the action. If this lays me open to criticism I would reply that I would prefer that rather than to make any contribution, however small and indirect, to the impersonal and mechanistic tendencies of the times.

✓

Before this file is finally closed it seems necessary to make some reference to the reasons which have made it impossible for me to carry out Sir David Petrie's instructions in Minute 27 above.

Instead of the 40,000-word manual which he would have liked to see I have prepared a "Brief Outline" (some 15,000 words) as suggested by D.B. (vide S.F.50-24-50) with a view to its being shown to Permanent under Secretaries and Directors of Intelligence. (It has been generally agreed that this "Brief Outline" is too long for the purpose, but that it is suitable for instructional purposes in the case of new officers). To attempt yet a third version of intermediate length (or 40,000 words) would be a waste of time and for this and other reasons I feel it to be a psychological impossibility. Among the other reasons is the fact that I could not write a manual on the lines laid down in Minute 27 because that is not how I "see" the whole subject. The difficulty is that Sir David Petrie and I see it from completely different points of view - so different as to be, in fact, incompatible. As far as I understand him, I think he feels that this office, after his re-organisation, has worked so successfully that it would be impossible for me to show that it had defects which should be avoided in future (as he directed me to do in his Minute 20 above), whereas, as I see it, it has been highly successful in spite of the gravest defects which have caused a very serious amount of friction (especially internally and in ^{and} our relations with S.I.S.), mental confusion and waste of effort/expense.

I decided not to attempt to set out my 'verdict' (as suggested in Minute 20) because to do so could not but involve criticism of Sir David Petrie and it is hardly correct to place on record in an open report a criticism of a superior officer while he is the responsible head of the office, even if he has invited it.

Moreover such a verdict could not appropriately form part of the record as I have written it. Instead of a 'verdict' I included at the end a brief reference (under the heading "The lessons from the past") to the essential principles of administration and organisation and their application to the particular case of the Security Service.

29th July 1946.

J.C.
J.C. Gurry.

Informal note of special difficulties in writing the history.

Special difficulties arose from my attempt to set out sufficient evidence to enable me to frame a verdict as required; and from the controversial period at the beginning of the war.

I have drafted the 'verdict' but have not submitted it because it involves controversial questions, which I would prefer not to raise. In Chapter IV (the period Sept 1939 - March 1941) I have attempted to indicate the divergent views held about the internal organisation and to do so impartially, but this will not be so clear if this Chapter is read by itself. I would ask that Chapters I to V should all be judged as a whole. I have attempted to treat the whole period 1908-45 as a unity with 3 main themes:- the problems set us by Germany & Russia and the organisational

adjustments made from time to time in the various attempts to cope with the situation as it developed.

The difficulty about the beginning of the war (1939-41) appears to me to be most acute in view of the fundamentally different mental approaches of the 5 or 6 chief participants in the attempt to cope with the situation. It is perhaps a mistake for me to attempt to write this chapter, at least without having the considered views of the chief participants on the development of the organisation; but I think it is not for me to say whether it is desirable that they should be asked to write reports on their own work & their part in the controversies.

DIRECTOR GENERAL'S STAFF

Director General (D.G.)

BRIG. SIR DAVID PETRIE

Deputy Director General (D.D.G.)

BRIG. O. A. HARKER

LEGAL ADVISER (S.L.A.)

Mr. J. L. S. HALE

**OFFICER IN CHARGE OF
PROSECUTIONS (S.L.B.1)**

Col. W. E. HINCHLEY COOKE

**LEGAL ADVISER TO S.L.B.1
LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION
(S.L.B.2)**

Maj. E. J. P. CUSSEN

RESEARCH

Mr. J. C. CURRY

(Res. 1)

Mr. F. B. AIKIN SNEATH

(Res. 2)

AGENTS AND PRESS SECTION

Maj. C. H. MAXWELL KNIGHT

(M.S.)

Capt. D. TANGYE

(M.S./P.S.)

OVERSEAS CONTROL (O.C.)

Lt.-Col. B. M. EDE

OPERATIONS (OPS.)

Lt.-Col. G. H. LENNOX

ROOM 055, W.O.

Mr. D. C. ORR

TOP SECRET

VOLUME III

CHAPTER V

	Page
PART 2	
COMMUNISM AND THE U.S.S.R. 1941-1945	339
(i) The C.P.G.B.: reactions to the German attack on Russia	339
(ii) The re-organisation of the Security Service 1941	340
(iii) F Division: policy questions	341
(iv) The Communist Party's Armed Forces Organisation ...	342
(v) Penetration by the Communist Party and leakages ...	344
(vi) The consequent attitude to the C.P.G.B.	349
(vii) The formation of Section IX of S.I.S.	349
(viii) The Comintern wireless system and developments after the dissolution	350
(ix) Soviet espionage	354
(x) The Fourth International and the Trotskyist Movement in Great Britain	358

PART 3	
THE ITALIAN AND JAPANESE SECRET SERVICES	360
(i) The Italian Secret Service	360
(ii) The Japanese Secret Service	362

PART 4	
INTERNAL ORGANISATION AND STAFF OF THE SECURITY SERVICE	363
(i) Administrative Services and Establishments	363
(ii) Registry and Organisation	370
(iii) Liaison with other Intelligence Services	376
(iv) The Director General's Staff	380
- The central administrative machinery	381
- Prosecutions	381
- Leakage of Information Section	382
- Renegades	386
- Operations Section	387
- Research	389
- Agents and the Press Section	389
- Overseas Control	394
(v) The Director General's review of the war period	398
(vi) The lessons from the past	401

APPENDIX I

LIST OF DIVISIONAL AND SECTIONAL REPORTS.

APPENDIX II

ORGANISATIONAL CHARTS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NUMERICAL LIST OF PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS.

INDEX.

PART 2.

COMMUNISM AND THE U.S.S.R.

1941-1945

(i) The C.P.G.B. reactions to the German attack on Russia.

The first reaction of the C.P.G.B. to the German attack on Russia was mentioned in the last chapter in connection with the statement issued by the Political Bureau of the Party before the Prime Minister made his speech on the evening of the 22nd June. For a few days afterwards there was a cleavage of opinion between those who desired to continue to attack the British Government and those who felt that the Prime Minister's promise of immediate aid to the Soviet Union forced the Party to support the Government and the war effort. On the 26th June 1941 Gallacher met representatives of the Press and said that the Party would support the Government in any steps towards collaboration between Britain and the Soviet Union. On July 4th the Central Committee declared that the war was a "just war" and issued a manifesto in which it said "the Communist Party in this grave crisis in which the fate of the whole of progressive mankind is at stake will work for and mobilise to win every citizen for the victory over Fascism". The confusion in the minds of the Communist Party leaders at this time was made evident by information which we obtained about the proceedings at a closed Party meeting, and the position was not clarified until Harry Pollitt addressed all branches of the Party on the 8th July. He declared in favour of a united national front of all those who were for Hitler's defeat; and stated that Comrade Stalin's reference to Churchill's declaration of support to the Soviet Union left no room for doubt what their attitude should be; that their fight was directed not against the Churchill Government, but against the secret friends of Hitler. One immediate effect of the changed situation was to restore Pollitt to the leadership of the Party.

The first characteristic of Party policy from now onwards was that their every effort was directed towards assistance for the Soviet Union and, incidentally, towards profiting by all efforts to promote Anglo-Soviet goodwill and to popularise the Soviet Union. The Communist Party asserted itself by staging displays on the occasion of Soviet anniversaries and other similar measures.

During the second half of 1941 the success of German military operations in Russia roused doubts whether that country would be able to

/resist

resist the German military machine successfully. This had the effect of making the question of Soviet espionage and Comintern activity against this country a question of far less imminence from the Security Service point of view than that of combating the German Intelligence machine. Moreover, apart from the usual sources of information about the C.P.G.B., all other sources had largely dried up or disappeared. Section V had lost all their agents inside the Comintern and affiliated organisations and had no other good inside sources of information.

(ii) The re-organisation of the Security Service, 1941.

In the meanwhile, as part of the re-organisation of the Security Service, F Division had been constituted in April 1941 as a separate Division under Mr. Curry as Deputy Director with two Assistant Directors, Mr. Hollis and Mr. Aikin-Sneath, in charge of the Communist and Fascist sections respectively. (The work of the Fascist section, F.3., has already been dealt with in Part 1 (vi) of this chapter in view of the close association between the B.U.F. and the potential Nazi "Fifth Column"). The sections retained their lettering as B sections until the re-organisation was completed by the Director General's circular of the 15th July 1941 and the Division came fully into being with effect from the 1st August when the sections were renumbered as F sections. Lt. Colonel Alexander was in charge of B.1 which became F.1 (Internal Security in H.M. Forces and Government establishments belonging to H.M. Forces) but the section maintained a partially separate existence and was not under the control or supervision of the head of the Division. Mr. Hollis, the Assistant Director, was in charge of F.2.a. (policy and activities of C.P.G.B.), F.2.b. (Comintern activities generally; Communist refugees) and F.2.c. (Soviet espionage).

In July 1941 a new section, F.4 was formed to watch for and receive information about new politico-socialist or revolutionary movements, in addition to taking over the investigation of Pacifist and anti-war movements.

Mr. Curry left the Division to join a new appointment as "Research" in October 1941 when Mr. Hollis became the Assistant Director in charge of the whole Division.

F.1 was dissolved in 1943 and a new post, that of Military Adviser to F Division (F/MA) was created. The reason for this change arose from the fact that there had been criticism both outside and within the Security Service of a certain rigidity of the working of F.1 and this became more prominent

/after

after the major change in the Communist Party line in the summer of 1941. It was found on various occasions that the Communist sections and the military section were interpreting events in different ways. Moreover

information which had become available to the Communist section allowed the Armed Forces Organisation of the Communist party to be studied at the centre rather than at the circumference. It was decided that for reasons of security the detailed material could not be made available for purposes of action to F.1. Consequently for an uneasy period the Communist Party's Armed Forces Organisation was dealt with in F.2.a. while the cases of individual soldiers were handled in F.1. The eventual outcome of this unsatisfactory situation was that F.1 officers were transferred to F.2.a. and F.3 - the former dealing with Communists and the latter with Fascists in the Forces. This change resulted in an improvement in working and was welcomed by the Service links, i.e. the officers in the Armed Forces responsible for dealing with this aspect of security.

(iii) F Division; policy questions.

F.2.a., whose policy had to be interpreted in terms of concrete cases arising from the day-to-day work of the section, found it necessary very rapidly to adjust their policy to the major change resulting from the German attack. The evidence available to the section soon made it clear that in spite of the Communist Party's support of the war effort its long-term policy was unchanged and the long-term policy of the section had to be adapted accordingly. It was not always easy to put this view before Government Departments which were profiting from the cessation of Communist obstruction and were in receipt of offers of positive help. It fell to members of the section to convince their opposite numbers in Government Departments that their views were soundly based on knowledge and experience. They felt that they had to make it clear that their views were "not merely the reactionary outpourings of people who had stuck to one job so long that their opinions had become ossified". One means by which the section's aims in this respect were achieved was the circulation of papers including Mr. Clarke's paper on the Unofficial Shop Stewards' Movement in 1941 and on the Communist Party - its aims and organisation, in 1945. Both these books are reported to have been received as outstanding studies which added considerably to the Government's knowledge of the subjects and to the reputation of the Security Service. Mr. Hollis was responsible for the preparation of a paper for the Home Secretary to submit to the Cabinet (vide Bibliography No. 16) and others of more general application were circulated in the form of Red Books. The views adopted by the

/section

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

Nov 1988

section were subsequently borne out by the cases of Springhall and Uren, which will be described below, as well as by the general circumstances of numerous leakages of important information.

F.2.b. was responsible for intelligence concerning the Comintern and its various ramifications, including that about alien Communists resident in or visiting this country. Its position in this respect was vitally affected by the failure of Section V to furnish it with any good inside information from abroad and by the change in policy regarding the carding of names abroad on the Central Index. Prior to the formation of Section IX of S.I.S., F.2.b. received from Section V a considerable volume of undigested papers. The effect of the situation thus created was to leave considerable doubt whether either the Security Service or S.I.S. accepted responsibility for maintaining adequate records about the Comintern after April 1941. The only palliative to this situation was that F.2.b. was in the hands of Miss Bagot whose expert knowledge of the whole subject enabled her to find and make available a large variety of detailed information based on the records of the past.

The work of F.2.c. has been discussed in detail under "Soviet Espionage". The only important success obtained during the war was Mr. Shillito's painstaking disclosure of Green's organisation as a result of interrogating him when in prison. Two other important cases, those of Springhall and Uren, were dealt with in F.2.a. on account of their close association with the British Communist Party.

(iv) The Communist Party's Armed Forces Organisation.

As already mentioned, the work of F.1 in connection with the Armed Forces was transferred to other sections and its place was taken by F/MA. After June 1941 the Communists in the Armed Forces concentrated on becoming efficient soldiers and F Division was therefore often in the position of warning the Army authorities about an aspect of security which had no immediate bearing on the discipline of regiments and other units and the natural reaction of a C.O. to representations on the subject of Communists under his command was that he was concerned with the present rather than the future. F Division, on the other hand, was unable to overlook the long-term problem which might arise if Communists attained high positions in the Armed Forces. They considered this question likely to be of special importance in the period after the occupation of Germany and represented the position as they saw it to the Secretary of State, the Adjutant General and the D.P.S. They also found it necessary to resist an attempt to cut down the internal security system under which "links" were maintained at Commands,

/and

and arrangements were made to vet the limited number of those holding temporary war-time commissions who were candidates for permanent commissions after the war.

This general question cannot be dissociated from the fact that the C.P.G.B. continued to maintain an organisation which concentrated its attention on the Armed Forces; and this organisation is to be viewed in the light of the way in which Communists look back to the pattern of the Russian revolution and the part played therein by the Russian Communist Party's success in winning over the Russian Army and especially the Petrograd Regiments as a part of their general plan for revolution. (Compare the line taken in the "History of the C.P.S.U.(Bolsheviks)", vide Bibliography No. 15).

From October 1939 until nearly the end of 1941 this organisation had been in the hands of D.F. Springhall and little was known about it except that he had a room near Party headquarters at which he interviewed soldiers. F Division also had information of the existence of a number of organised Party groups in the Forces. Towards the end of 1941 Springhall handed this work over to R.W. Robson of the Control Commission under whom the work was developed and systematised. Robson himself interviewed officers and two of his assistants dealt with other ranks and with civilian contacts. Robson partly inherited from Springhall and partly built up an organisation which was designed to cover all the major military areas in this country. In many Communist Party districts an individual was appointed to be responsible to Robson for this work. These individuals were often under-cover members of the Party and each of them had a number of local contacts. It was the duty of these contacts to be in touch with Party members in the Forces in their areas and to notify the district representative of the particulars. The machinery did not work very efficiently and the headquarters records were also found to be inadequate for such a widespread organisation. F Division, however, obtained information of the names of some twelve hundred members in the Forces which is said to be about a fifth of the known number. Arrangements to extend the organisation among the Forces overseas were also made, but here again it did not always function efficiently.

The Party in Great Britain attached great importance to keeping the secret of their Forces Organisation. Most of their communications were sent by hand and those which went through the post usually took the form of a simple introduction to a friend who happened to be stationed in the neighbourhood. The secrecy of the interviewing room in London was also jealously guarded and Robson was, on one occasion, 'trailed' by Springhall in order to make sure that he was not being shadowed. The Party realised that the existence of a Forces Organisation might be used as a powerful weapon against the Party and their view seems to have been that the authorities knew little, if anything, about it. An additional reason

/for

for secrecy was that the Organisation brought a steady flow of secret information about weapons and about operations to Party Headquarters.

The war-time problem presented to the Security Service under the conditions of conscription was very different from that of the pre-war period when individuals could be excluded or discharged from the Armed Forces. The various complications which arose are discussed at length in the sectional report and cannot be detailed here.

The most significant result of F Division's investigations into the Communist Party's Armed Forces Organisation under Robson's control was the extent and importance of the leakage of military information to the Communist Party. In certain cases action was taken and a few officers were dealt with by being excluded from positions in Intelligence or other posts. One officer was prosecuted and convicted under the Official Secrets Act. The general effect of F Division's enquiries, however, was to show that the Security Service was not in a position to prevent members of the Communist Party from having access to important secret work or from obtaining positions of trust and leadership. One factor in this difficult situation was that members of the Communist Party were frequently chosen for secret work on account of their technical ability and zeal.

(v) Penetration by the Communist Party and leakages.

One important source of information about the Armed Forces Organisation, as about other parts of the Communist Party's machine,

materially helped in disclosing two main types of leakage. The first was the disclosure of operational and political information which would be primarily of value to the Communist Party for its political purposes. The second was the disclosure of information about military and other equipment which was of no direct or immediate value to the Communist Party, but might be of interest to the Soviet authorities.

Some of the more important cases of leakage - including those from the Armed Forces and Government Departments - were the following:-

Disclosure in the Daily Worker of conversation between Mr. Lees Smith and Sir Alexander Maxwell about the Communist Party.

Offer of figures relating to strength and disposition of the R.A.F.

Information about the War Office estimate of the results of the Dieppe Raid.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

Nov 98

/Advance

Advance information about North African landings

List of duties of Military Intelligence Sections of the War Office.

Disclosure by of particulars about S.O.E. work.

Two disclosures of the Ministry of Information weekly report on public morale (probably through Louis Moss).

Two disclosures of details of radio-location equipment, one and probably both by Samuel Cohen.

Disclosure of S.O.E. operations by

Disclosure by Secretary of A.Sc.W. of report relating to jet propulsion and other matters.

Disclosure of Cabinet document relating to the Communist Party through

Two disclosures of political documents circulated to Ministers by Margot Heinemann.

Disclosure of information about aircraft by Kerrigan and a member of the Soviet Trade Delegation.

Disclosure of anti-submarine device by

Disclosure of formation of 2nd Army Headquarters at Oxford.

Disclosure about "Squid" by a member of a film unit by a naval officer.

Disclosure of information about Greek political situation by a member of P.W.E.

Disclosure of another anti-submarine device.

Statement that Professor Blackett (Scientific Adviser to Admiralty on Operational Research) had given information to the Party before June 1943.

Disclosure of a new type of periscope through Idris Cox and James Shields to the Russians.

Disclosure about Pluto by and Union officials. Disclosure about Mulberry by

Disclosure of P.I.D. Overseas directive.

/In addition

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

Nov 198

In addition there were a number of trivial cases and there were several disclosures in connection with the operation of the "internal security" system - i.e. that for dealing with Communists and Fascists in the Armed Forces.

In many cases the name of the Party member was discovered by subsequent investigation or because they identified themselves at the time that they made the disclosure, but no prosecution was possible in such cases because it was more important to safeguard the source of information. Where possible arrangements were made to neutralise the danger.

After the arrest of Springhall and Uren F.2.a. prepared a memorandum to which was attached a list of fifty-seven members of the Communist Party known to be engaged in the Services or in Government Departments or in the aircraft or munitions industries on work of some secrecy. It was pointed out that while some of these had obtained their positions through the inevitable loop-holes in the vetting system the cause in most cases was the absence of a general policy in different Government Departments towards the problem created by the existence of the Communist Party. While the advice given by the Security Service in such cases was uniform, some Departments followed it while others appeared to treat the matter as one having little practical bearing on their own responsibilities. The Security Service, therefore, suggested the desirability of a uniform policy being adopted by the different Departments.

These proposals were submitted to Mr. Duff Cooper who sent a short memorandum to the Prime Minister in which he suggested the transfer of all the persons named on the list to other work. The Home Secretary supported this memorandum and stated that he was in favour of a general circular to all Departments describing the risks involved in the employment of Communists and Fascists on secret work. He also suggested that there should be a public statement by the Government about the leakages of information to the Communist Party.

The Prime Minister decided against making any public statement. He ruled that instead of the whole responsibility for Communists already in employment in Government Departments resting on the Security Service a secret panel consisting of three members of the Security Executive, a representative of the Prime Minister, and those of the Treasury and the Department concerned should be appointed to examine all such cases. The final decision whether action should be taken was to rest with the Department. The system, however, proved ineffective and the Security Service proposal that a uniform policy should be adopted by Government Departments remained inoperative.

/By July

By July 1942 the Political Bureau of the C.P.G.B. was advocating mass pressure on the Government to compel it to take action to establish a second front. It maintained that there could be no second front without a great mass movement, and no such mass movement without the Communist Party organising and heading it. In this way, by its propaganda, the C.P.G.B. continued to act as an instrument of Russian policy.

At the same time evidence was obtained by secret means which showed that the Communist Party's aim of promoting aid for the Soviet Union had not caused any fundamental change in its long-term revolutionary aims. In the first half of 1942 a series of instructional classes were held in various parts of the country to train new candidates for positions of trust. It was explained that the classes were held for industrial leaders because similar classes were held in Russia before the revolution and without such classes "our own revolution will be disorganised and fail". It was emphasised that the Party was a revolutionary one, and that the workers had to break up the power of the capitalist regime by disintegrating the army, seizing key points, factories, railways and docks, and by eliminating the police. Control must be obtained by armed workers and, according to at least one instructor, bloodshed would be necessary, although he did not want to advocate it.

F Division prepared a report (vide Bibliography No. 16) in December 1942 for the Home Secretary to submit to the Cabinet which outlined the policy followed by the Communist Party from the beginning of the war until the attack on Russia, and on subsequent developments as outlined above in Chapter IV and in the preceding paragraphs of this chapter. In submitting this report they suggested that while every member of the Communist Party was not aware of the Party's revolutionary programme, the Party itself believed that its leaders, properly instructed, would be able to carry the rank and file with them far down the road to revolution.

The paper was put to the War Cabinet together with another paper dealing with Fascists in this country and the Home Secretary proposed that both should be published. The Cabinet, however, decided against publication. This decision appeared to F Division officers to be the right one in the state of public opinion at that time. A White Paper would probably have failed to have its full effect and circumstances might arise when the object of providing a check to the Communist Party could be more successfully achieved.

The new phase of Communist Party policy was marked by a change of attitude towards the Labour Party. This phase was inaugurated in August 1942 with an attempt to appeal to the rank and file over the heads of the leaders with the ultimate aim of bringing about affiliation. The campaign for

/affiliation

affiliation became one of the biggest the Party has ever conducted in this country. As part of this campaign a congress was held in June 1943 in connection with which a balance sheet of the Party's finances was published and new draft rules were produced to replace the existing rules which were not suitable to the new circumstances.

A few days before affiliation had been rejected by the Labour Party Conference the dissolution of the Comintern was announced. Although a major obstacle to affiliation was thus removed, it was too late to help the C.P.G.B. on this issue. An interesting indication that the C.P.G.B. was not in close wireless touch with the Comintern is that it had no prior warning of the impending dissolution, and first heard of it through the ordinary press channels.

By a dramatic accident D.F. Springhall, the national organiser of the Party, was arrested the day after the rejection of affiliation in the presence of the whole Political Bureau on charges of espionage for which he was subsequently convicted. There is no doubt that this arrest was a serious shock to the Party and affected their line of action at that time. They denied all knowledge of Springhall's activities and expelled him from membership.

Springhall's case, which is briefly described below under "Soviet Espionage", was important, not only as showing how British Communists could serve as agents of the Soviet Intelligence on a large scale, but also because it led to our receiving further indications of the extent to which Communists in the Services and Government Departments were in a position to obtain information which could not but be of value to the C.P.G.B. for the purposes of pursuing its general aim of revolution.

The enquiry into Springhall's case led to the disclosure of the fact that he was in touch with an organised group of Communists among the professional and intellectual classes. This and other enquiries showed that a considerable number of Communists in these classes held positions of trust under the Government and that many of them were in a position and willing to give away to the C.P.G.B. or the Soviet authorities information about important secrets connected with new inventions and military operations. Thus, one Communist each was discovered in the Security Service, S.I.S. and S.O.E. respectively, although there was no reason to think that any of them had been able to give away information of first class importance. They were all removed from the service, and in the S.O.E. case Captain Uren was convicted. Other enquiries again had shown that there were Communists in institutions engaged in scientific research and in industry with access to various parts of important and secret technical processes. Many of these were known to be actual, and all were potential, sources of leakage of information to the C.P.G.B. or the Soviet Government. Finally, among a number of

/Communists

Communists in Government Departments there was one in the Home Office who was, at one time, in a position to see some of the F Division reports on the C.P.G.B. and cognate matters; and one in another Department with access to Cabinet papers.

Thus, while the Communist Party remained a very small affair and failed to make any effective appeal, or to obtain any important increase in influence or membership, the situation created by the fact that so many of its members secured important positions gave it a potential importance far greater than that warranted by its numbers. The alliance with the Soviet Government and the common purpose in the war were obstacles in the way of a more drastic policy for excluding Communists from positions of trust. Cases occurred where Communists in the Services were excluded from positions, for instance, on the Intelligence staff, but, owing to the difficulty of keeping in touch with their movements, subsequently obtained similar positions with the armies in the field.

(vi) The consequent attitude to the C.P.G.B.

In the absence of any definite charter or instruction as to the scope of its responsibilities, F.2.a., the section of F Division dealing with the C.P.G.B., has aimed at keeping itself informed of important developments in policy and the maintenance and development of records of individual members of the C.P.G.B. and of the Trotskyists.

The extent to which Party members belonging to the intellectual and professional classes, including scientific and technical experts, secured positions both in Government and in industry gave grounds for urging that full records of individual Communists should be maintained as far as possible. Against this, considerations of economy and policy in regard to the maintenance of records influenced the Director General in the opposite direction. In August 1945 the position was that no solution satisfactory both to the Deputy Director of Organisation and F Division had been reached - for details see the F.2.a. report (S.F.50-24-44(76) Y.B. 6382).

(vii) The formation of Section IX of S.I.S.

In May 1943 the relations of F Division with S.I.S. were changed by the creation of Section IX of S.I.S. This new section was created by C.S.S. and Colonel Vivian because it was thought that recent developments had shown that the subject of Communism required to be handled by an officer who was not trammelled by the urgent needs of the Section V staff in connection with the war. Mr. Curry was lent to S.I.S. by the Director General to form Section IX.

/The immediate

The immediate result was to show that Section V had been unable to cope with current information on Communism which had been coming into S.I.S. and that the S.I.S. Registry was inadequate for the purpose. There were large numbers of undigested papers, some of which disclosed that Censorship material supplied important evidence regarding instructions issued from the Comintern to Communist Parties in the Americas, while others laid bare the working of an organisation in North and South America which was interesting itself in the case of Trotsky's murderer at that time in prison in Mexico. Some of the individuals connected with this organisation had belonged to the International Brigade and the enquiry raised important questions regarding the use of members of the International Brigade for conspiratorial work as well as that of Stalin's attitude to, or concern in, the murder of Trotsky. These questions did not, however, admit of satisfactory answers in the light of the available evidence, but they had a bearing on enquiries into members of the International Brigade with which F Division was occupied. Numerous cases occurred in which information was required by the Foreign Office, or otherwise, about the records of important Communists and experience showed that the S.I.S. Registry was often unable to produce records of information obtained from S.I.S. sources but that the information could be obtained by F Division of the Security Service from its records. This was due to the inadequacy of the staff of the S.I.S. Registry on the one hand and on the other to Miss Bagot's exceptional knowledge of the subject and her ability to connect traces from our records even when names abroad had not been carded in the Central Registry.

(viii) The Comintern wireless system and developments after the dissolution.

The formation of Section IX was the result of Mr. Hollis' action in urging the importance of the question of the use of wireless for the transmission of messages between London and Moscow as raised by certain circumstances which had recently come to the notice of F Division. In February 1943 James Shields of the Control Commission of the C.P.G.B. had arranged to recruit a girl named Jean Jefferson, a former student of the Wilson School in Moscow, as a radio operator to work a station at her home in Wimbledon, for which purpose she was to retire from ordinary Party activity. From the information it appeared that the Party had been in radio communication with Moscow until a short time previously, but that at this time they were receiving messages in a cipher which they could not read. It also appeared that they knew that certain parts of the messages should be sent on to America. Robert Stewart, a member of the Control Commission who had conducted much of the Party's underground

/work

work and had directed its radio organisation (as part of the Comintern network) some years before the war, was in charge of some part of this scheme for wireless communications. A close watch was placed on the activities of these three individuals and the whereabouts of all Wilson School students were ascertained. Arrangements were made to co-operate with S.I.S. and R.S.S. and it was learnt that the latter had records of what were described as considerable "bundles of Russian traffic".

The dissolution of the Comintern took place at the end of May, and on June 10th Stewart, who had just come out of hospital, announced at the C.P.G.B. headquarters that the station had been put out of commission; that he had stopped receiving and transmitting a long time before, but he thought that the Russians must have been trying to send a message at the time when the dissolution of the Comintern was announced.

Within a fortnight of the dissolution Stewart arranged to see one Samuel Cohen and his wife, both of whom were ex-students of the Wilson School. Later, in September 1943, Stewart referred to Cohen as having worked for him for some time, and from this P.2.a. drew the inference that Cohen had been operating the Comintern radio station in this country and had probably ceased operations at the end of 1942 or early in 1943; and that the dissolution brought the transmissions to an end.

In the meanwhile Colonel Vivian and Section IX had taken up the matter with R.S.S. and G.C. & C.S. and it transpired that there was a network, the centre of which appeared to be near Moscow, the traffic of which had certain similarities with the old Comintern network. The cipher was complex and appeared to be unreadable.

Section IX, however, had come to the conclusion that certain documents received from the American Censorship which had contained messages in secret ink on letters from New York to Mexico City were indications that the machinery of the Comintern was continuing to function in some form after its dissolution. One message in particular called for reports on the effects of the dissolution, but in the absence of full background information regarding the context of these messages it was necessary to treat with caution the inferences which they suggested.

Early in 1944 G.C. & C.S. officers succeeded in reading some of the material. It showed that messages were being exchanged between a station near Moscow and a number of other stations, including some in China, Poland, Yugoslavia, France and possibly others in Holland and Scandinavia. Even then there was great reluctance to divert any resources and any energy or manpower from radio interception directly connected with the war; and Section IX found it necessary to exert

/continuous

continuous pressure for several months in order to provide for the development of this work. By the middle of 1944 a certain amount of material connected with China, Poland, Yugoslavia and France became available; and it was discovered that messages to the first three of these countries had been issued at the time of the dissolution in terms identical with the messages in secret writing intercepted by Censorship when passing between New York and Mexico City as mentioned above. In the light of these facts obscure words in the text of one message in secret writing from New York were safely identified as meaning that that message was from Georg Dimitrov, formerly Secretary of the Comintern and now Chairman of the Commission appointed to wind up its affairs, and that it was addressed to Earl Browder, formerly head of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. now supposedly converted into "the Communist Association". The inference was drawn from this that the machinery of the Comintern was still functioning after its dissolution; and subsequent messages showed that there had been no change in the nature of the communications issued from the Comintern to the various countries, but they had continued on the same lines after the dissolution. This evidence obviously had an important bearing on the position of the British Communist Party as a section of the ostensibly dissolved Comintern.

Before leaving Section IX in November 1944 Mr. Curry prepared a summary of the conclusions which could be drawn from this material up to November 1944. Some of the more important points were that the Polish evidence showed that the controlling station near Moscow was that of the Comintern and that this conclusion was supported by evidence from Yugoslavia, France and China. The Comintern or "post Comintern" organization had been closely associated with the Polish Communist Party in the arrangements which led to the establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The latter was placed in control of the Polish Armed Forces in the U.S.S.R. and Poland; and an organ had been created consisting of village, district and regional "Rada" or Councils with the P.C.N.L. at the apex. Communications between Moscow-Slovenia, Moscow-Croatia and Moscow-Tito Headquarters showed that a similar system of government was being established in Yugoslavia. The messages Moscow-France included reports on the Comites Departementaux de Liberation and on the Milices Patriotiques. (The Milices Patriotiques had been debarred by the de Gaulle Government from exercising police functions in connection with *épuration*). The texts Moscow-China reflected a completely different social and political structure from that in the European countries. In China the Comintern was concerned with a region completely under Communist control and an administration based on the Communist armies of China. The Communist Party of China was sending long reports to the Comintern of their difficulties with the Kuo Min Tang, on their partisan warfare and on the "disintegration" work - assisted by Japanese Communists -

/directed

directed against Japanese troops. The messages showed the Chinese Communist Party as receiving assistance from the Comintern and asking them to obtain the advice of the Red Army Staff in matters connected with partisan warfare in Inner Mongolia.

The summary drew attention to the resemblance between the Rada (Council) of Poland and the Odbor (Council) of Yugoslavia, each including members of Communist and other parties under its Committee of National Liberation on the one hand and the Soviets of Russia on the other; and mentioned that the Soviets had been composed of the members of the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary as well as the Communist Parties after the February and before the October Revolution of 1917. It quoted the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and Trotsky as showing that the Communist Party came to power mainly through two important moves; through securing control of the Armed Forces and of the Soviets. These considerations gave rise to a number of questions regarding the national Communist Parties and the Comintern as instruments of Russian policy. It was suggested that this interception of Comintern wireless might furnish useful evidence and that it seemed desirable to take all feasible measures to extend its scope. At the same time the security of this material was of special delicacy in view of the extent to which the Communist Party here had succeeded in obtaining information through a number of Government Departments.

There was no evidence, either of a technical kind derived from R.S.S. or otherwise, to show that a station in Great Britain was included in this Comintern network. On the contrary, the circumstances in which the British Communist Party received its first intimation about the dissolution of the Comintern from the Press and the information obtained by F Division relevant to the project of establishing a radio transmission station in 1943 appeared to negative any such suggestion. At the same time the facts relating to Robert Stewart's meeting with Samuel Cohen and his wife a fortnight after the dissolution of the Comintern; the fact that the Communist Party in London had been in radio communication with Moscow shortly before February 1943 and knew that certain parts of the messages should be sent on to America, taken together with the fact that messages relative to the dissolution were received in the middle of 1943 in the U.S.A., China and other countries, all combine to suggest that the exact position regarding transmissions Moscow-Great Britain and Moscow-U.S.A. has not been fully cleared up.

All the circumstances furnished yet another illustration of the importance of the Security Service being fully informed by S.I.S. regarding developments abroad because of the light they may throw on the development of the British Communist Party as a section of the Comintern. Without this illumination the course of events may easily be misunderstood and their significance may be wrongly interpreted. This

/point

point is emphasised because until recently the attitude of S.I.S. has been - it is understood to have been greatly modified - to suggest that events outside the three-mile limit are not necessarily the concern of the Security Service unless they have a direct bearing on events or organisations inside it, whereas the Security Service point of view is that much may be lost if the whole picture is not made available to them.

(ix) Soviet espionage.

The general nature of the information derived from enquiries into previous cases, especially those of Percy Glading and Krivitsky, furnished the general pattern of the methods employed by the Soviet Secret Military Intelligence. These cases indicated that the Russians tended to work along the same lines, and also emphasised the importance of the fact that they had at their disposal an almost unlimited number of co-operators in the shape of British Communists as well as an efficient and highly trained staff of experts to control and organise them from the shelter of positions of diplomatic privilege. Percy Glading and his assistants were all British subjects and were all members of the C.P.G.B. who dropped Party work as soon as they were recruited. The Party had no official knowledge of their activities, although certain Party officials were fully informed.

Glading was the organiser of a group of sub-agents, but was not allowed a free hand in controlling it, being under the orders of a foreign resident agent in this country who was in control of finances. The methods employed were simple and practical. Sub-agents in the various departments of Woolwich Arsenal brought out plans and specifications in the evenings when they left work and handed them to Glading, who immediately had them photographed. The originals were replaced by the sub-agent when he arrived at work the following morning.

This pattern conformed to that described in detail by Krivitsky. Krivitsky mentioned the diplomatic bag as the chief means of communication with the U.S.S.R. and stated that the material for transmission in it was always recorded by photograph. He believed in the extensive use of women "cut outs" and considered that the only effective means of combating Soviet espionage were to effect the "growing up" of an agent from without (as was so successfully done against Glading) and, secondly, the bribery of known Soviet agents who, in such cases, would have an effective guarantee against reprisals.

/In 1942

In 1942 Mr. Shillito of F.2.C. interrogated a British subject named Oliver Charles Green who had been arrested on a charge of forging petrol coupons when a search of his house had led to the discovery of photographs of certain War Office secret documents. Green was skilfully induced to furnish information on the subject of espionage and admitted that after joining the International Brigade in Spain he had agreed to engage in espionage in England on behalf of the U.S.S.R. His statement showed that Green was in touch with two Russians believed to belong to the Russian Trade Delegation, but that everyone else connected with the organisation was a male British subject. Green said that he had recruited a number of such persons as agents and they included an informant in the army, a fitter in an aircraft factory, a sailor in the Mercantile Marine, a member of a Government Department, an individual having access to aircraft factory output figures and a member of the R.A.F. SP4

His statement also showed that the greatest precautions were taken in the conduct of the operations of this organisation. Meetings were most carefully arranged so as to avoid suspicion and prevent shadowing, and care was taken to see that no one, whether a member of the C.P.G.B. or otherwise, who was thought likely to have a security record was employed on this work. Green stated that a number of wireless operators and transmitters were used, care being taken to avoid power-operated transmitters on the ground that if the signals were D/Pd in a certain area and the power then cut the disappearance of the signals would confirm the accuracy of the D/Ping. Transmissions were made about once a fortnight late at night or early in the morning when fewer wireless owners were likely to listen in, and alternative wave lengths and automatic transmissions were employed, the tapes being cut, most probably, by hand punchers. Automatic high speed transmission was used in order to save time and to increase the difficulty of radio direction finding, but his remarks in this connection have not been substantiated. The organisation, as described by Green, conformed generally to the Krivitsky pattern and importance was attached to the fact that it was another instance of the wide use by the Russians of members of the International Brigade for recruitment as intelligence agents employed against this and other countries. Green's statements regarding the use of wireless transmitters have never been satisfactorily cleared up. The case was also another instance of the rule that the C.P.G.B. as an organisation was not concerned and that the Russian organisation was run independently of the Party, although individual Party members of prominence were probably involved.

The case of D.F. Springhall, who was convicted of offences against the Official Secrets Act on July 28th 1943, showed an important divergence from previous experience. Most notably he was not only an active member of the Party, but was head of

/its

its Organisation Department, a member of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee. In spite of this, his arrest came as a complete surprise to the majority of Party officials and to the rank and file, except those associated with him. He used members of the Party but not the actual apparatus of the Party for espionage purposes and he was in direct touch with the Soviet authorities. At the same time, the methods were less skilful than those of his predecessors. There was reason to think that he had been active for some years and had some excellently placed informants and might have escaped detection but for a piece of negligence on his part. He was in touch with a Mrs. Sheehan, who was employed in the Air Ministry and gave him particulars of a new and highly secret device, details of which she had obtained from a file which had passed through her hands. Springhall interviewed Mrs. Sheehan at her flat which she shared with another woman whose suspicions were aroused by overhearing a description of Air Ministry passes and of the secret device. This woman communicated with an R.A.F. officer who seized an opportunity to steam open a letter intended for Springhall which contained, among other things, references to the secret device mentioned above. The subsequent enquiry led to the examination of a diary in which Springhall had made a large number of cryptic entries and some of these entries led to further information being obtained about middle-class Communists with whom he was in touch. Among these were a secretary in S.I.S. and Captain Uren of S.O.E.

The character of the information gathered by Springhall appears to have been very varied and much of it was of such a nature that it might be of interest either to the C.P.G.B. or to the Soviet authorities. For instance, Springhall was asked whether he had any knowledge of future military operations or of the establishment of a second front in the near future. The Communist Party at that time was actively engaged in propaganda in connection with a second front.

A survey of the cases of Soviet espionage which have been briefly mentioned in this and the preceding chapters leads to two main conclusions. The first is that counter espionage measures are not easily taken with success in time of peace or against the Secret Intelligence Service of a country with which we are at peace or in alliance; and that this is particularly so in the case of Russia. The second conclusion is that the cases which have been detected can only represent a small part of the effective work done by the Soviet Military Intelligence against us in any one period. The Soviet Military Intelligence Service has a great advantage compared with any normal state in virtue of the fact that it has so many opportunities of exploiting the position created by the existence of numerous British Communists and Communist sympathisers. Many of these individuals are in positions of confidence and trust and feel a greater obligation of loyalty to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics than to their own country, or even to oaths by which

/they

they have been bound. The characters and sympathies of such persons are well known at Party Headquarters; their suitability or otherwise for secret work can be guaranteed and means of making contact with them can be provided.

The Soviet system of employing a "legal" resident agent in an official position who works through an "illegal" resident agent working under cover through groups of sub-agents provides a difficult problem for solution by the ordinary means at the disposal of the Security Service, namely, the H.O.W., the shadowing staff and the penetrative agent.

Difficulties have been enhanced by the conditions existing after the establishment of our alliance with Russia which caused the Foreign Office to place rigid restrictions on action by the Security Service aiming at the detection of the secret agents of the Soviet. In order to avoid compromising ourselves it has been necessary to rule out any attempt to penetrate Russian official or Trade Delegation circles in this country, either by winning over any of the staff or by introducing an agent among them. For the same reason any attempt by the use of mechanical means to obtain inside information has been impossible, although this means has been used with effect at the other end of the chain, i.e. among British Communists. All attempts at intercepting Russian wireless communications have produced negative results and it is only to be expected that if the Soviet Embassy wireless has been used for Secret Service purposes precautions have been taken to use unreadable ciphers. The Russian diplomatic establishment in London consisted of over ninety individuals at the end of the German war, and this number is much larger than that of the American Embassy but is parallel with the size of Russian Embassies and Legations in many other countries. Soviet officials and members of the Trade Delegation have paid numerous visits to every sort of factory and establishment in this country and have frequently been found attempting to see more than they were intended to see and, as the references to leakages through British Communists have shown, they must have received from such sources many indications of where to look and what to look for.

Observation on members of the Embassy staff has been a matter of extreme difficulty on account of the numbers involved and the location of the building they occupied. Moreover, as might be expected, Soviet officials in London are not only under strict discipline but under the supervision of a detachment of the NKVD - which no doubt helps as an incentive to moral rectitude and also creates the difficulty caused by the possibility of our shadowers being counter shadowed.

/(x)

(x) The Fourth International and the Trotskyist Movement in Great Britain.

After Trotsky's expulsion from the Communist Party, mentioned in Chapter II, Part 4 (v), he founded the Fourth International and continued to propagate his views. Whether his quarrel with Stalin was mainly a matter of principle or of a personal struggle for power, the doctrinal differences between them centred round the question of the possibility of the victory of "Socialism in a single state". The Trotskyists held that the Stalinist policy was both theoretically wrong and impracticable. The insignificant number of Trotsky's adherents throughout the world did not, however, prevent his death from being an object of conspiracy in which members of the International Brigade were prominent.

The Trotskyist Movement in Great Britain was probably more insignificant than most others. In 1939 it consisted of a few small and disorganised groups, the official section of the Fourth International being known as the Revolutionary Socialist League. Another group of some slight significance was the Workers' International League, founded in England in 1938 by two South Africans. Some of the leaders went to Eire soon after the outbreak of war, partly to make contact with Irish Trotskyists and partly to avoid military service and the repressive measures which they thought would be taken against their organisation.

The crisis of 1940 led the Workers' International League to change their policy and members of the Party joined the Armed Forces instead of trying to evade service. They continued, however, to attack the Government and to voice their opposition to the "Imperialist" war.

By the time of the German attack on the U.S.S.R. the W.I.L. had consolidated their position and were ready with a programme - "a fighting programme to mobilise the masses for the struggle against Fascism, whether of the German or the British variety and for the defence of the Soviet Union". At the same time a main plank in this programme was to assist in bringing a Labour Government to power in Great Britain with the object of eventually persuading the masses to turn towards Trotskyism as a result of the failures which they expected would attend on a Labour Government in power. The ultimate aim was the full Marxist programme with "labour to power" as the slogan of a transitional period.

In 1942 the first national conference of the movement was held; a constitution was adopted comprising a Central Committee, a Political Bureau and a District Organisation on classical Communist lines. The "basic documents of the Fourth International and the transitional programme" were formally adopted as the foundation of policy. As a means of preparing a

/revolutionary

revolutionary situation the W.I.L. resorted to the promotion of strikes in industry wherever opportunity offered and so far as their limited resources permitted. Instances were at the Rolls Royce factory, Glasgow; at the Dalnair Ordnance Factory and the Betteshanger Colliery in 1941; Vickers Armstrong, Barrow in 1943; and the Tyneside Shipyard Apprentices strike in 1944. The last of these led to four of the leaders being prosecuted after searches under D.R.39(A) had been carried out at the Trotskyist Headquarters in London, the Militant Workers' Headquarters in Nottingham and some houses in Glasgow and Newcastle. Sentences of imprisonment resulted, but on appeal were quashed on a point of law.

The movement now called itself the Revolutionary Communist Party, but the summer of the Second Front proved unpropitious for industrial agitation and its somewhat remarkable programme came to a standstill. In January 1945 the Revolutionary Communist Party decided that its political position had sufficiently improved to justify its contesting a Parliamentary election and it put forward a candidate in South Wales. While it did not hope for success it expected to consolidate its position and to receive publicity, otherwise unobtainable. The candidate, Jock Haston, polled 1786 votes and forfeited his deposit. No accurate figures of the present membership are available, but in February 1943 full members of the Party in Great Britain numbered 800 with an outer circle of 2,000 active associates.

Although the Trotskyist Movement is not financed, controlled or directed by a foreign power, it has been the subject of casual observation by the Security Service for some years. If this is not strictly within the four corners of the purposes for which the present Security Service was created in its original form, as M.I.5., it is a matter of convenience to the Home Office to obtain information about it from the Security Service sources. There is, in fact, no other organisation in this country readily available for the purpose of making enquiries by secret means. The Home Secretary has occasionally issued warrants for the purpose, and the Trotskyist Movement has now come to be included among the accepted responsibilities of the Security Service.

In 1942 an agent was introduced by M.S. into Workers' International League circles with results which proved more valuable than was realised at the time. Security Service references to the Police have led to a certain number of Police Forces undertaking enquiries and at least five Police Forces had placed agents in the movement by the end of the war. Some of these produced information of some importance. In the autumn of 1944 the Revolutionary Communist Party made an interesting attempt to run a double-cross agent against the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police. They instructed him to accept the proposals of the Special Branch officer and hoped as a result to estimate the amount of

/information

information which Special Branch possessed and also to distract them with false information. Their plan broke down as the result of an indiscretion.

Since the middle of 1943 the Party's activities have been found to deserve closer interest than the somewhat casual attention which had previously been paid to them. The Revolutionary Communist Party uses conspiratorial methods and takes the strictest security precautions in connection with letters, telephone conversations and especially in its courier service with the headquarters of the Fourth International. It followed that the simpler methods of investigation could only fail to discover the real activities of the Party and if used alone would convey a false impression. As a result, observation on this movement has required a larger proportion of time and energy than the smallness of the organisation seemed at first sight to warrant.

PART 3.

THE ITALIAN AND JAPANESE SECRET SERVICES.

(1) The Italian Secret Service.

There is no evidence to show that secret agents of any of the various branches of the Italian Intelligence Services were operating in this country either before or during the war (except in the very limited sense indicated in Chapter IV above). They appear to have directed their attention almost entirely to the Mediterranean area and from the information available it is not easy to assess their importance or to gauge the efficiency either of the organisations or their agents.

The available information was summarised by Section V in "The Italian Intelligence Service", dated 15th July 1943 (vide Bibliography No.46). According to this there were separate Services for the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Foreign Office and the Fascist Party, while the duty of counter espionage was entrusted to the Carabinieri Reale. The Military Service, known as the "Servizio Informazioni Militare", is mentioned as covering a wide field, but it was believed not to have achieved any conspicuous success and to have been the cause of dissatisfaction. The Naval Service, "Servizio Informazioni Navale", was believed to be the most efficient, but very little was known of its work. Its connections with naval operations in the shape of under-water attacks on British warships in Alexandria and Gibraltar are mentioned in Part 1, (iv), (e) above, under the heading of B.I.C. The

/Air

Air Service, "Servizio Informazioni Aeronautica", was reported to have been a small organisation, but to have taken over the task of sending agents to Egypt and the Levant owing to the lack of success on the part of S.I.M.

On the other hand, after the British Services in Italy co-operated with S.I.M. against the Germans during the campaign in that country, a more favourable opinion was formed of their efficiency.

In all the circumstances counter espionage against the Italians fell mainly on S.I.M.E. and on the representatives of Section V in the Mediterranean area. Very little in the way of exchanging information took place on this subject between these two branches of our Intelligence Services and the Security Service in London. In summing up the position S.I.M.E. have stated that the Italian espionage system was crippled by the departure of consular officials and the large-scale internment of Italian civilians when Italy entered the war. No evidence was obtained that the Italians had prepared any efficient underground network. It was not until late in 1941 that they developed any serious attempt at espionage. This was chiefly based on Athens and directed against the Levant coast and Egypt. Between October 1941 and December 1942 eleven low-grade agents were despatched by S.I.M. from Athens to the Middle East. The majority were Armenians and were distinguished by their low mentality, poor efficiency and insufficient training. Early in 1943 the Italians left a W/T network of post-occupational Arab agents behind them in Tripolitania. This network was easily broken up, one of the agents being used for double-cross purposes. Co-operation with the Germans was reported to have been neither very productive nor free from friction.

In a note dated 10th July 1942 (vide S.F.52/Italy/10) R.I.S. dealt at length with an analysis of Italian wireless transmissions, some of which were believed to be part of a communication system for Italian under-cover activities which were partially identifiable with the known characteristics of under-cover transmissions intended to be undertaken by Italian agents in British controlled territory. It is not known whether this interception of Italian Secret Service W/T was subsequently pursued as it related exclusively to the Mediterranean area, and there was no indication of any station or agents in or connected with the United Kingdom. It is possible that if any further information was received, it was not communicated to the Security Service. The ground for this suggestion is that in certain other cases Lt. Colonel Cowgill gave instructions that results obtained by R.S.S. in the interception of German and Russian W/T of an under-cover nature should not be communicated for this reason, i.e. because they referred to stations or agents outside the United Kingdom. It is also not known whether any information on the subject of Italian wireless was communicated by Section V to their representatives in the Middle East or to S.I.M.E.

/All the

All the circumstances would seem to indicate that contact between London and Cairo was not as close as it might have been and that, in war-time as well as in peace-time, closer co-operation and more frequent visits by senior officers from both ends are desirable.

(ii) The Japanese Secret Service.

Information about the Japanese Secret Service after the Japanese attack in December 1941 which became available to our organisations in the Far East and in India has not been received in London in any collated form. The picture of the Japanese Intelligence Service is still far from complete and information relating to the subject is still being assessed and collated by the Counter Intelligence Central Bureau operating under S.E.A.C. So far indications are that the Japanese Secret Intelligence Service was a somewhat diffuse organisation whose operations have on the whole produced poor results. The history of the action taken to deal with the problems created by it and of the adjustments made in our organisation for the purpose has not yet been written.

Some information on the subject was received through the interception of the communications between Tokyo and the diplomatic representatives in Europe. Several of these officials were in touch with the German and Italian Secret Services as well as with their Foreign Offices and other principal organs of government. Japanese diplomats in some of the European capitals conveyed information, often of a doubtful kind, to Tokyo in the shape of agents' reports and many of these were a mixture of official diplomatic intelligence and information derived from more underground sources. As explained elsewhere many of these intercepted Japanese reports furnished us with useful indications for the purpose of assessing German intelligence, including, for instance, their appreciations of the information planted on them by our double agents.

PART 4.

INTERNAL ORGANISATION AND STAFF OF
THE SECURITY SERVICE.

The internal organisation and staff of the Security Service were the concern of A Division under Colonel Butler throughout the war. There were the following sub-divisions: Administrative Services and Male Establishments, Accounts and Finance, Women's Establishment, Regional Control, Registry and Organisation. Of these sub-divisions Regional Control has been dealt with in Chapter V, Part 1 (viii) above. Administrative Services and Male Establishments were under the Assistant Director (Lt. Colonel Cumming); Accounts and Finance (Miss Constant) was under the direct supervision of Colonel Butler; Women's Establishment (Miss Dicker) was under the Deputy Director Organisation (Mr. Horrocks), who was also responsible for the Registry and Organisation.

(i) Administrative Services and Establishments.

The Assistant Director Administration was responsible for the following subjects:-

1. Relations with the Ministry of Labour
2. Transport
3. Supplies
4. Technical Equipment
5. Communications
6. Scientific work
7. Ciphers
8. Evacuation schemes and accommodation
9. Recruitment of male staff (Lists 183)
10. Civil Defence
11. Security and Guards
12. Photographic reproduction of records
13. Billeting
14. Printing, Duplication and Photography
15. Messengers, Cleaners and Industrial Staffs
16. Insurances - Life and Property
17. Passes
18. Recruitment and training of manpower in war
19. Security Service versus M.I.5. (Supply anomalies)
20. Reckonability of service
21. Air travel
22. Booking of rail tickets and hotel accommodation
23. Booking of long sea passages
24. Internal security at Country Office
25. Lectures to Police
26. Usage of A Division 'links' for B, E and F Division purposes

27. Relations with local Police (Country Office)
28. Medical arrangements
29. Exemption from Jury Service
30. Administrative Services for I.P.I.
31. Catering and Canteens.

These subjects did not occupy the whole of his time and, as mentioned in the section report, he found that in practice as much as seventy-five percent of it was taken up with a number of matters of a miscellaneous nature concerning discipline and domestic matters of delicacy which were dealt with by the Director General personally, the Deputy Director General or the Director A Division.

In addition A.D.A. was responsible for dealing with all the administrative aspects of the work of the other Divisions of the Service in matters concerning the machinery for technical means of investigation. This included the administrative details connected with arranging for Home Office Warrants for telephones, microphones and other similar matters. As a result of this familiarity with the machinery of the "technical" means of investigation he was responsible for providing information and assistance to those concerned with the planning of major operations, including COSSAC, SHAEF, the 21st Army Group, A.F.H.Q. and S.I.M.E. and for arranging for trained staff to assist them. From 1942 onwards he was concerned with the administrative arrangements of this nature for the I(B) Staff of the 21st Army Group and for the elements of the Control Commission which it was proposed to set up in Germany after the war. Broadly speaking the field covered -

- (a) the provision of staff and equipment for Field Intelligence laboratories and -
- (b) the "offensive" and "defensive" aspects of sound recording apparatus.

Most of the subjects dealt with by A.D.A. are normal administrative matters, but present problems which vary according to the circumstances of the case. There are, however, three which deserve special mention, i.e. Technical Equipment, Scientific work and the problems arising from the fact that the staff of the Security Service was composed of individuals some of whom were classed as civil and others as military.

Technical Equipment. Prior to 1936 the imposition of a telephone check under the Home Secretary's warrant had involved a laborious and uneconomic process by which the G.P.O. provided a group of reliable supervisors to listen to telephone conversations using headphones. There were obvious limits and difficulties arising from the language problem and otherwise and to meet them the G.P.O. research station developed suitable equipment for recording the conversations. Other difficulties arose as a result of air-raids during 1941 and 1942, an important limiting factor in urgent cases of

/suspected

suspected leakage being the engineering problem of making the necessary electrical connection at short notice, particularly at night. Other problems again were connected with arrangements for imposing telephone checks in distant parts of the provinces for which purpose portable recording machines and the necessary staff were despatched to a convenient local centre, the records being sent to headquarters for transcription.

A constant problem arising from telephone checks and microphones concerned the staff employed to listen to the records and make the necessary transcriptions. The problem of the human element arises from the extreme importance of accuracy and the strain which this imposes on the listeners. Some records for instance are much clearer than others and in practice it is often found that a listener has to hear a record three or four times before being reasonably certain of the accuracy of the transcription. In important cases records have to be listened to by more than one person and even good records give a surprising scope for different interpretations. Staff employed constantly on this duty find it extremely trying and even under war conditions it is often distasteful to many. The need for accuracy and for reliable staff was illustrated by a case in which the Security Service was compelled to duplicate the work of S.I.S. in listening in to the Egyptian Embassy. This case arose out of the suspicion that the Egyptian Ambassador had undesirable relations with persons suspected of pro-enemy sympathies or associations. The Security Service check proved that an unreliable listener had produced some of the more sensational items out of his own imagination. His dismissal was no compensation for the immense amount of time and labour wasted.

Scientific Work (Secret Graphic Communications). From 1918 to the beginning of this war all technical work connected with secret graphic communications and other matters into which problems of chemistry entered was centred in the M.I.5. laboratory, at first under the direction of Mr. S.W. Collins and later under Mr. H.L. Smith assisted by Mr. Collins in a consultative capacity. At the beginning of this war Mr. Collins was made responsible for Censorship testing and various Censorship laboratories were established both at home and abroad. One of these overseas laboratories was that at Bermuda which, under Dr. C.E. Dent, was successful in detecting secret writing and microphotographs in numerous series of letters and thereby proved a major factor in enabling the F.B.I. to uncover enemy secret agents in America.

S.I.S., S.O.E. and M.I.9. all developed aspects of this type of work for their own purposes and by the beginning of 1942 at least five separate technical establishments were concerned in producing and detecting secret graphic messages with virtually no collaboration and no exchange of information on new developments between them. This situation

/Involved

involved certain dangers. It was possible for example that one laboratory might independently discover an ink already developed and used by another and then unwittingly exploit it in a way which would compromise its original use; or again Censorship in the legitimate exercise of its functions might discover and apply tests for secret writing which, when observed by the enemy, might suggest to him methods unknown to Censorship but actually in use by, say, S.I.S. or S.O.E. There was also a certain amount of duplication of effort and a certain degree of unnecessary risk of the leakage of information especially where reference to outside experts was involved.

It was decided that the best solution was to be found in the appointment of a senior scientist to act as co-ordinator in the work of all the laboratories and to be responsible to a committee consisting of the deputies to the heads of the participating departments. In May 1942 Professor H.V.A. Briscoe was appointed in this capacity and the results were generally regarded as extremely satisfactory.

One important development in the Security Service field was to demonstrate the necessity for the close integration of this type of scientific work with intelligence. After 1942 the principle was accepted that a scientist should personally visit places where the interrogation of suspects was taking place, should consult with the interrogating officer, examine the whole of the suspects' baggage, papers, books and other possessions and when he considered it necessary take any of them away for examination in the laboratory. In many cases a substantial part of the property was thus taken for investigation by X-ray, for more detailed inspection by ordinary or ultra-violet light or for chemical analysis. This procedure has been fully justified by results and in a number of cases the evidence thus found has led to the detection of spies and in others it has afforded useful improvement in our knowledge of enemy methods. The essential condition for success in such cases is the close and untrammelled contact of the trained and experienced scientist with all the known facts about the suspect.

Arrangements were made for collaboration with overseas laboratories. In the summer of 1943 S.I.S., anticipating the developments to be expected in the war against Japan, decided to establish a specialised laboratory in Calcutta. In August 1944 it was agreed that the three clandestine services most concerned in the Far Eastern theatre, i.e. S.I.S., S.O.E. and O.S.S. should exercise joint executive control over this laboratory, the technical control being in the hands of Dr. Higgins acting in close collaboration with Professor Briscoe in London. Dr. Higgins' services were also made available to Censorship and D.I.B. Delhi. Again in 1943 when plans for the invasion of the Continent were being made the need for a similar Intelligence laboratory was recognised and SHAEF agreed that one should be equipped to go overseas with the 21st Army Group.

/In the

In the autumn of 1944 the post-war needs of S.I.S. and the Security Service, as the only two departments concerned with long-term considerations, came up for discussion and it was decided that the Security Service laboratory should absorb the work done for S.I.S. Similarly S.I.S. photographic research work was handed over to the Security Service laboratory in April 1945. Before the war the combined needs of the two services were covered by one whole-time and one part-time chemist. In April 1945 the technical staff consisted of one senior qualified chemist, two junior qualified chemists, two senior and one junior laboratory and photographic assistants.

The above are the two most important directions in which A Division contributed directly to the development of technical measures in aid of the Intelligence work of B Division.

The third subject described as deserving special mention is the purely administrative one arising from the fact that among the officers of the Security Service some had had civil and others military status, the choice being based on the needs and advantages of the Service, often without reference to the personal interests of the individual. The result has been to give rise to a number of anomalies which have created difficult administrative problems, a solution to which has not been found at the time of writing (the end of 1945).

While the other administrative functions of A.D.A. and his staff do not require detailed description as they are of an incidental nature, they nevertheless involve an important and indispensable contribution to the general efficiency of the Service and many of them have necessitated a great deal of labour. As Lt. Colonel Cumming himself put it - "The work of the 'Administrative Services' branch of A Division in war was largely concerned with harnessing the staffs of 'servicing' departments to the Security Service cause. Without taking any account of the Registry, Overseas and Regional Control and Accounts, the number of staff shown (e.g.) on any Organisation chart as coming under 'Administrative Services' comprised only some half dozen officers and a score of staff. In practice, however, A.D.A. had, at the peak, 326 members of ancillary services (messengers, drivers, etc.) for whom he was directly or indirectly responsible and through whom the administrative functions of the Security Service were discharged." A study of the details must be relegated to the divisional history (vide S.F.50-24-44(15)).

Fluctuations in strength of officers, secretarial and Registry staff. The following figures show how the strength has fluctuated between January 1938 and July 1945:-

/Officers

Officers:-

January 1938:	26
July 1938:	28
January 1939:	30
July 1939:	36
January 1940:	102
July 1940:	175
January 1941:	230
July 1941:	254
January 1942:	307
January 1943:	332
January 1944:	323
January 1945:	273
July 1945:	250

Secretaries and Registry Staff:-

January 1938:	86
January 1939:	103
July 1939:	133
January 1940:	334
July 1940:	516
January 1941:	617
July 1941:	822
January 1942:	934
January 1943:	939
January 1944:	852
January 1945:	748
July 1945:	647

These include the strength of D.S.O.s abroad and R.S.L.O.s but do not include the figures of S.C.O.s at ports, a note about which is given in Chapter V, Part 1 (vii). The figures for women include those at home and abroad but the latter are sometimes only approximate owing to some staff being recruited locally.

Officers Establishment. Between the wars officers were recruited entirely by personal recommendation and in view of the conditions of service few were attracted who were not in possession of private means or a pension from other Services. The position of the permanent staff was completely changed as a result of Sir David Petrie's initiative in 1944 which resulted in Treasury approval of a pension scheme on lines similar to those of the established Civil Service. This scheme was equally applicable to men and women.

The rapid recruitment of the large increase of staff necessitated by the expansion after the outbreak of war presented problems of considerable difficulty. In the first place it was entirely done as the result of personal recommendations, but in the later stages a certain number of officers were obtained from the Armed Forces on the ground of special qualifications such as linguistic knowledge for the purposes of interrogation. A large proportion of the temporary staff

/were drawn

were drawn from the legal profession, members of the Bar predominating. There were Dons from the universities and the engineering profession, archaeology, industry, the arts and science were also represented.

Questions of grading of the temporary staff are too complex for discussion here and numerous anomalies arose on account of differences of pay and questions of military rank.

Women's Establishment. As in the case of men the permanent staff between the wars was recruited entirely by personal recommendation. To meet the difficulties created by the war it was extended to application to secretarial colleges and even to advertisement in the Press.

The figures given above show that the proportion of women to men was often in the neighbourhood of three to one. While a considerable proportion of the work done by women was of a routine nature both in the Registry and otherwise, a large number of both the secretarial and Registry staff sometimes had opportunities to do work requiring initiative, powers of organisation and administrative ability.

The work of the Defence Security Officers overseas called for both secretarial and Registry staff. Sixty-six women have been sent overseas at various times to offices in the following places:-

Bahamas	South Africa
Bermuda	West Africa
British Guiana	Malta
Leeward Islands	Gibraltar
Jamaica	Palestine
Trinidad	Egypt
U.S.A.	Ceylon
Canada	Rangoon
Newfoundland	Singapore
East Africa	Hong Kong

As in the case of other Services a number of women were employed on officers' duties with rank either as Administrative Assistants or in Grade I. A few of these positions were filled by direct appointment, but most of them by promotion from the Registry or secretarial sections. In the latter case their previous knowledge and experience of office procedure often gave them an advantage over the untrained male officer. In all fifty-nine women have held officers' posts.

A few cases where women held posts which offered scope for special initiative and originality have been mentioned in the course of this record, but there were many others in which women officers displayed similar qualities and undertook duties involving responsibility or requiring experience in the

/presentation

presentation of evidence as well as resource and initiative. Women officers were employed in the preparation of cases in S.L.B.; in the work of collation and research in the preparation of papers for use in interrogation; in research work of the type done in B.I. Information and in the War Room. They were employed as sectional officers in all Divisions, including those dealing with enemy aliens, British and foreign Communists and British Fascists, and as such sometimes represented the Security Service at meetings with officers of other departments; took part in the interrogation of women suspects or agents; and in some cases "ran" agents, including in one case controlled double-agents.

A most important function performed entirely by women was that of the Accounts Staff under Colonel Butler and Miss Constant. The same applies to the cipher work and the printing press. Women also held responsible positions in D.4, where they had to deal with and take responsibility for decisions in more or less delicate matters referred to Head Office by the S.C.O.s at the ports when dealing with aliens' arrivals. In addition to all this were the important duties performed by women in administrative positions in charge of the staff to whom it fell to smooth over difficulties and to help in maintaining morale in adverse conditions such as those created by the evacuation to the country office; and the important administrative posts in the Registry.

(ii) Registry and Organisation.

From 1940 onwards Mr. H.H. Potter was head of the Registry under the general direction of Mr. Horrocks as Deputy Director Organisation.

Mr. Horrocks has furnished the following account of the development of the Registry:-

"1. In June 1940 the organisation of the Service had all but broken down. The rapid development of the war and consequent growth of the Service were the causes.

2. An examination of the situation showed at once that while a re-organisation and redistribution of the work of officers was necessary, the provision of an efficient Registry was the first and most urgent need if a complete breakdown were to be averted.

3. While it is axiomatic that efficient intelligence work depends primarily on good records, the Registry had been allowed to lapse into a most lamentable position. The causes were assessed as follows:-

/(i)

(i) The absence of directives to, or interest in the work of, the Registry by the officers.

(ii) The arrangement of the work of the Registry on a sectional basis by which each section dealt with files pertaining to a selected subject or subjects. Each section did all Registry action on its own files hence wide differences in procedure developed. The arrangement gave an officer the opportunity to divest himself of all responsibility regarding records and to become increasingly dependent on his Registry section for information and even guidance.

(iii) Under this system the work of the Registry sections developed into a scramble to keep the officers supplied on most urgent matters. Arrears accumulated and were often concealed. Files were not made and there was no time to train new staff, many of whom were completely ineffective after six months or more service.

(iv) There was a shortage of staff, but as mentioned above no means of making them effective had they been available.

(v) The Central Index had been allowed to lapse into a lamentable state:-

- (a) cards were misplaced;
- (b) there were practically no guide cards;
- (c) the cabinets were overfull;
- (d) there was duplication of cards;
- (e) unnecessary carding abounded;
- (f) new cards were not filed at once.

(vi) The basic system of filing was inefficient and inelastic. While a diminishing number of individual files were made the records of those individuals on which interest centred (Aliens, Right and Left Wingers) were filed on a subject basis (i.e. Communists in Northumberland). The effect was that to obtain complete information regarding an individual several files were needed, many of which were required by other officers for other individuals. So few obtained the files they needed and officers' rooms were stacked with unanswered correspondence and with files all awaiting other files which could not be obtained. Personal files were classified in series, this being a quite unnecessary complication in the process of file making.

(vii) There was no control of the transit and movement of files. Officers held on to files thus depriving others of their use.

(viii) To relieve the situation labour was wasted in searchers or "snaggers" whose average production was two files per day!

/(ix)

(ix) Accommodation was lamentable.

(x) There was an absence of accord and harmonious working between the Registry and the remainder of the Office. Each tried to score off the other with the result that both lost.

(xi) It was impossible to obtain any accurate figures of the arrears on hand. Sections referred vaguely to "many papers" or confessed their utter inability to count what they had.

(xii) The head of the Registry had insufficient status.

4. In determining the steps to be taken due consideration had to be given to:-

(a) the necessity for keeping the Service going;

(b) the certainty that any improvement would unloose a wave of criticism good or uninformed which had been dammed up by utter hopelessness;

(c) the necessity to weld the Service, officers and Registry alike, into a co-operative whole, helping each other for the common cause.

5. The re-organisation began in July 1940 with:-

(a) Re-arrangement of the work of the Registry sections on a process basis. The processes were:-

A3A - look-up, custody of indexes;

A3B - connecting, custody of files;

A3C - review, i.e. the examination of papers for the purpose of giving precise directions for Registry action;

A3E - filing of papers;

A3G - carding of current files (a sub-section carded p.a. files);

A3H - extracting;

A3K - file-making;

A3L - 'snag' section, i.e. searched for files wanted before other files and papers could be released.

(b) Authority was obtained for more staff which, because of (a) above, could be made immediately effective. Increased and better accommodation was also prepared.

/(c)

(c) The subject files referred to at 3(vi) above were recalled to the Registry. Tags were cut and the files housed in boxes. This enabled papers relative to any one individual to be circulated without immobilising those of others. From this stage the knot began to untie. One numerical numbering series was adopted for personal files.

(d) The marking of individual files was stepped up to some 2,500 per week.

(e) All arrears were brought to light - sorted - and a beginning made to liquidate them.

(f) The carding of all vetting cases and generally of names of those against whom nothing was known was discontinued.

6. In August 1940 a new system of controlling the transit of files was introduced.

7. The changes described above brought about an immediate improvement in the situation. The speed of improvement was, however, greatly hampered by the enforced cessation of work during air raids.

8. On September 29th 1940 the Central Index and some of the records were destroyed by enemy action. In consequence the whole of the Registry and certain other sections of the Service were evacuated to the country.

9. The first task on reaching the new quarters was to create an Index which would serve temporarily while the Central Index was reconstructed. This was done in a few days by compiling an Index of the names of all file holders - some 100,000.

10. The Central Index had been microphotographed and immediate steps were taken to produce prints. The re-production was very poor and the work of reconstructing the Index was formidable and it was not completed until June 1941.

The experience of reconstruction showed, however, that the Index was still a very imperfect instrument and that the eye strain from looking at the photographs was too severe to be contemplated for a long period.

The Index was re-typed and the opportunity taken to:-

- (i) eliminate unnecessary cards;
- (ii) abolish duplicates and amalgamate files where necessary;
- (iii) re-group on a phonetic basis;
- (iv) separate out cards for impersonal matters.

The work was completed by March 1944. The cards in the Index still numbered about a million

/and

and a quarter, though three-quarters of a million had been eliminated for one reason or another.

11. By early 1941 arrears had disappeared and the "snagging" section was abolished. The training of Registry staff in all processes continued and it was possible by stages to amalgamate the processes of carding, filing and file-making.

12. In April 1941 it was possible to make a major change in procedure, which, while adding to the working efficiency, was the means of fostering that co-operative working between the Registry and other parts of the Service which contributed so much to the success of the later war years.

Up to April 1941 all incoming papers were passed in the first instance to the officer concerned who, after a preliminary review, passed them to the Registry for previous papers or other action. The change made was to pass all incoming papers to the Registry in the first instance, where steps were taken either to pass the paper to the officer with all relevant files, or to register the paper and add to the Index immediately, or to take steps to obtain the relevant file for the officer. At the same time the duty of directing Registry action in carding, making new files or extracts was laid squarely on the officers. The Registry were given the right to question incomplete or excessive requests or to raise matters of principle affecting Registry action.

When certain matters of principle had been determined the new system proved of inestimable benefit to all. Visits by officers and secretaries to the Registry were encouraged. Officers assisted by giving talks to the Registry on their subjects. In April 1941 the Registry Examiners were formed on whom the duty lay of examining all files returned to the Registry and of acting as the focal point of contact between the Registry and other sections.

The total effect was to bring about the accord and co-operation essential to efficient working of the Service.

13. Subject and Policy Files.

Up to 1941 one section of the Registry had handled all "SF" files whether dealing with impersonal subjects for investigation or the policy and administration of the Service. The policy and administrative files were left with the special section, the remainder passing to the main Registry.

The Index to policy matters was entirely re-made and the files overhauled and re-classified. This began in August 1942 and was completed by January 1944.

14. Destruction.

In 1940 a number of old files of no current interest were destroyed. In 1942 a properly constituted destruction section was formed whose duty it is to review in conjunction with officers individual or series of files for destruction. Much remains to be done, the measure of progress being only the staff available.

15. B Division Files.

When B Division began, early in 1941, to come to grips with the German Espionage Service, it became vitally necessary to safeguard certain particularly delicate sources, and a small 'local' Registry (then termed B.1 Registry) was created for the primary purpose of restricting knowledge of the sources and their products to those to whom the files passed for registration. In course of time B.1 Registry became a repository not only for information derived from certain secret sources but also for all material of significance to the study and frustration of German espionage. The files containing both types of material circulated only among B.1 officers and B.1 Registry.

16. War Room Registry.

For some three years B.1 Registry remained in London apart from the main Registry. Its records of personalities connected with the German Intelligence Service expanded greatly as knowledge increased. Towards the end of 1943 the pressure was such that criticisms of the performance of B.1 Registry began to be heard and these, together with the renewal of air raids upon London, in early 1944, and the then unknown risks of the threatened V weapons, led to the transfer in February 1944 of B.1 Registry to the country to come, with the designation R.B., under the control of the main Registry.

Many adjustments were made to the methods practised by B.1 Registry in order that they should conform whenever possible to the now proven standards of the main Registry. Each card in the R.B. Index was compared with the Central Index, and a great many discrepancies and omissions so revealed were adjusted. Additional staff for R.B. was recruited from the Central Registry staff and the considerable arrears of work tackled and eventually overtaken just before D-Day of 1944.

The records and performance of R.B. and of the officers served by R.B. put M.I.5. in the position of being the only intelligence body in this country which could continue to function adequately and at a sufficient speed. Consequently when the War Room organisation - originally a joint affair of M.I.6. and the American O.S.S. - came under criticism for its unsatisfactory

/performance

performance, the revised War Room included a number of M.I.5. officers and the entire staff and records of R.B. were put at its disposal.

R.B. thus became partially a SHAEF unit, bearing the designation WR-H (i.e. subsection H of the SHAEF C.I. War Room). Its functions continued along the familiar lines, but certain new tasks fell to it. The principal new duty consisted of an obligation to furnish from records details of individuals of interest to the C.I. staffs. These details, in the form of draft index cards, reached the C.I. staffs through the SHAEF organisation EDS, which reproduced thirty-five copies of each index card for distribution to the various holders of the SHAEF index, which was intended to contain the names of all persons of whom the C.I. staffs should be advised during the fighting and afterwards.

WR-H had thus a double duty to discharge upon each paper - first, to index and maintain its files in the normal manner, and second, to select and transmit to EDS those names appropriate to the SHAEF index.

As the armies advanced, and finally when Germany was overrun, enormous numbers of official German documents were captured. Those which contained material of interest to the War Room - i.e. those relating to German Intelligence Services - provided large numbers of names suitable for the SHAEF index, and many of these names, in so far as they were of internal "office" personnel rather than agents or senior officials, were naturally hitherto unknown to the War Room Registry; and many new details of people already on record came to light in the captured documents.

The burden of handling this great volume of material, together with a heavily increased flow of interrogation reports of captured persons, threw a heavy strain upon WR-H, and various technical amendments to the normal working arrangements had to be made to maintain a high standard of service."

Copies of the Organisation Charts dated July 1941 and April 1943 are attached at Appendix II. Developments in the war situation necessitated frequent changes, many of which have been mentioned in the text.

(iii) Liaison with other Intelligence Services.

Section V of S.I.S. The closest liaison was, in the nature of things, that maintained with Section V of S.I.S. which has been described at some length in Chapter I and

/referred

referred to throughout this history. The difficulties which arose during the war years and have been the subject of frequent mention may, to a certain extent, have given a distorted view of the position. In the day to day work close liaison existed at all levels and covered almost all the subjects dealt with by the Security Service. It should be emphasised that the relations were excellent before the war and that even during the war they were good at the sectional and sub-sectional level. The difficulties arose from the different views entertained in the two Services of the functions of Section V.

As explained in the first chapter a principal cause of these difficulties was the claim by the head of Section V to have the right to withhold information about counter espionage matters on the ground that they and not the Security Service were concerned with persons or events outside the three-mile limit. This was to claim a position entirely different from that of any other circulating section of S.I.S. These circulating sections exist in order to furnish information to the major departments and there can be no reasonable ground for argument that the true function of Section V is other than to furnish information from abroad about foreign Secret Services to the Security Service; even if they may sometimes and incidentally communicate to the Foreign Office such aspects of it as have a bearing on foreign policy.

The fact remains, however, that the great success of B Division during the years 1941-1945 would not have been feasible if R.S.S., R.I.S. and G.C. & C.S., for the efficient organisation of which C.S.S. was responsible, had not provided it with the ISOS material. It must be remembered that the Security Service had not taken advantage of the opportunities offered to it - in 1938, throughout 1940 and finally in March 1941 - to incorporate R.S.S. and to develop to the full capacity a unit which could have been constituted as an inseparable part of its own organisation. S.I.S. had stepped into the breach and, through the highly efficient staff provided for the purpose in R.S.S., R.I.S. and G.C. & C.S., had made the vast network of Abwehr and Sipo und SD wireless accessible to B Division. Without this help B.I.A., Camp O20 and the L.R.C. would have been compelled to work largely in the dark. The degree of success achieved in interrogation and the confident planning of deception would have been impossible. Criticism of the narrow, selfish and incompetent handling of the ISOS problem by Lt. Colonel Cowgill as the head of Section V should not be allowed to detract from the supreme achievements in this field by the organisations under C.S.S.

S.O.E. Liaison with S.O.E. was developed after 1942, in the first place through Commander Senter and Miss Sample, both of whom had previously served in the Security Service and afterwards joined the S.O.E. Intelligence Directorate under Air Commodore

/Boyle

Boyle. Commander Senter arranged for Miss Sample to maintain a close liaison with Miss Wadeson, the head of the L.R.C. Information Index, and to exchange information on lines discussed above in connection with the L.R.C. In March 1943 this liaison was further developed by the appointment of Major Wethered of the Security Service to act in liaison with the staff under Air Commodore Boyle in order to examine the cases of S.O.E. agents who arrived in this country after being in enemy hands or after falling under suspicion for other reasons. The position was further strengthened by the appointment of Mr. Hardy of the Security Service to a position in the S.O.E. Intelligence Directorate. The procedure was that when such an agent returned from the field, he was examined in the course of a formal enquiry at which Major Wethered usually presided and if necessary he was subjected to cross-examination. The country section of S.O.E., i.e. the section responsible for the agent usually adopted the attitude that they had full confidence in him but that the Security Service must be allowed to examine people coming into this country from the security point of view.

These enquiries assumed importance because, as was known from the records at the L.R.C. and from other sources, many of the S.O.E. organisations abroad - especially those in Belgium and Holland - were badly "blown" by the spring of 1943. In these circumstances there was an obvious danger that through some of these "blown" organisations the enemy might learn not only of impending S.O.E. operations but of major military operations as well. This naturally became a matter of increasing importance on account of the preliminaries to the "Overlord" operation. Under Security Service advice every possible precaution was taken, such as a personal search of outgoing agents by Customs experts and an examination of clothes and documents to prevent or minimise the risk of their betraying the agent.

While the Security Service was anxious to ensure security from their own point of view, i.e. to prevent the enemy from obtaining information from or about this country through the S.O.E. agents whom they might have turned round, the S.O.E. country sections were also anxious from their own and entirely different point of view to ensure the security of their operations. For this reason they were always unwilling to supply to the Security Service detailed operational information. Apart from this difficulty the exchange of information between the two Services was reasonably free and full. S.O.E. supplied detailed information about cases and organisations which had gone wrong and Major Wethered obtained from the Security Service records, and especially from the L.R.C. Index and traces, all kinds of details about an agent's associations and other

/matters

matters bearing on his case. Similarly information was supplied to S.O.E. about enemy organisations in occupied territory and such details as might facilitate the agent's movements through enemy controls. Copies of all interrogations at the L.R.C. were also supplied to S.O.E. during the latter years of the war, but S.O.E. depended on the L.R.C. Index and on Security Service Registry traces for the co-ordination of intelligence. They had no systematically planned intelligence of their own to support their operational undertakings, although each of their country sections no doubt accumulated intelligence as it went along.

The liaison with S.O.E. in connection with sabotage has been described above in the section dealing with B.I.C.

The facts as a whole suggest the possibility that closer liaison could have been arranged with mutual advantage, but from the Security Service point of view the position was regarded as satisfactory and was contrasted very favourably with that under which the Security Service had no information about S.I.S. agents who were "blown" and no opportunity of making enquiries into such cases.

Allied Intelligence Services. Liaison with Allied Intelligence Services in London during the war was in the hands of E Division sections in respect of Allied nationals in this country and of the L.R.C. in so far as cases of incoming Allied nationals were concerned. Before the war direct liaison on the subject of German espionage was maintained by agreement with Section V with the Deuxieme Bureau in Paris and on the subject of Communism through the American Embassy in London. As a result of this contact Captain Liddell visited New York and Washington before and during the war and developed an exchange of information in connection with the NSDAP and German espionage. After America came into the war the F.B.I. sent representatives to be attached to the staff of their Embassy in London and Mr. Mills, who went to Canada as the Security Service representative, also established contact with the F.B.I. The general subject of liaison with the Americans was among the many causes of difficulty and disagreement with Section V who maintained that all liaison should be done through their representatives in New York and Washington. A specially close personal liaison with the Czech Intelligence Service in London was maintained throughout the war by Captain Liddell and Mr. White.

Dominions and Colonies. This is discussed below under Overseas Control.

I.P.I. (Indian Political Intelligence). Liaison with I.P.I. has been extremely close and cordial over a long period extending back to the war of 1914-18. It covers the whole range of Security Service subjects from enemy espionage and

/Communism

Communism to general questions of security. For many years I.P.I. has been located in the same building as the Security Service and a free exchange of information has taken place. For instance, I.P.I. has at times, through its agents, obtained inside information of value to the Security Service about the British Union of Fascists or about British Communists. By arranging Home Office Warrants the Security Service has co-operated in regard to individuals of interest to I.P.I.

I.P.I. is in effect the section of the Security Service which deals with Indians, Burmese and Afghans and information on these subjects is recorded in I.P.I.'s Registry and not in that of the Security Service. Surveys of specific subjects prepared in the Security Service are normally supplied to I.P.I., who contribute to the general pool by providing information on such subjects drawn from Indian and Burmese sources.

Throughout the war the arrangement continued by which I.P.I. worked in the same premises as the Security Service and in close liaison with them.

In 1941 I.P.I. were given free access to the Security Service files, and the position of the two Services was more clearly defined. The recording and indexing of all activities of Indians, Burmese and Afghans in the United Kingdom was recognised as an I.P.I. responsibility and was discontinued by the Security Service.

To their mutual advantage the working of the two Services became even closer as the war progressed and developments made the interchange of information and the use of one another's facilities essential.

I.P.I. work under the general direction of the India Office and in close contact with the Director of the Intelligence Bureau under the Government of India, and the Security Wing of the Burma Police.

(iv) The Director General's Staff.

The Director General's staff consisted of two groups of officers, of whom the first formed part of the central administrative machinery of the Office and the other performed miscellaneous functions which were associated with the functions of the divisions.

Those forming part of the central administrative machinery were the Deputy Director General, the Legal Adviser, the Secretariat and the Private Secretary.

Those associated with the functions of the Divisions were those concerned with prosecutions, leakage of information, cases against renegades, operations, research, agents and the Press Section, Room 055 War Office and Overseas Control.

/The central

The central administrative machinery.

The Deputy Director General had no separate functions and relieved the Director General of general supervisory work and miscellaneous administrative detail. The Legal Adviser, Mr. G. St. C. Pilcher - first assisted and later succeeded by Mr. J.L.S. Hale - was also Legal Adviser to divisions and sections. In the early stages of the war they were mainly occupied with questions relating to internment or detention and releases of enemy aliens and British subjects. The Secretariat came into existence early in 1941 at the instance of Lord Swinton who considered that it was necessary to have a focal point for decisions of policy affecting the Security Service as a whole. He used the Secretariat to enable him to deal with questions of policy which were of considerable complexity and variety at this time when the Home Defence Security Executive under his chairmanship was seeking to co-ordinate security work in and between a number of Government Departments and authorities. The position was changed after the re-organisation of 1941 when Lord Swinton's interference in the internal affairs of the Security Service came to an end. From then onwards the Secretariat continued to perform a useful function in dealing with all questions involving policy, especially where there were conflicting views within the Security Service. The Secretariat served to assemble the views of divisional officers and present them to the Director General for his decision.

Prosecutions (S.I.B.I.). From September 1939 onwards the Security Service in the course of its work was continually being brought into contact with cases which, although they had to be investigated primarily from the intelligence and security standpoint, were none the less likely, sooner or later, to find their way into the criminal courts. Colonel W.E. Hinchley-Cooke, who had unrivalled experience in this field, was at that time attached to B Division and, although a number of cases were referred to him in order that he might advise upon the prosecution aspect, there was no hard and fast rule in force.

When the Security Service was re-organised in 1941 the Director General set up an additional legal section, called S.L.B., under the direction of Colonel Hinchley-Cooke, who was assisted by Mr. (now Lt. Colonel) Cussen. This section was charged with the duty of ensuring that intelligence and security investigation marched hand in hand with preparation for prosecution.

All sections of the Security Service were instructed that whenever they were dealing with a matter which might lead to prosecution they should at an early stage acquaint S.L.B. with the facts and act upon their advice as to the safeguarding of the prosecution interest.

/S.L.B.

S.L.B. in the result became the liaison between the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Security Service and also, so far as Army and R.A.F. personnel were concerned, between the Office of the Judge Advocate General and the Security Service. Where necessary S.L.B. were in touch with the Naval Law Branch of the Admiralty on matters affecting Naval personnel.

It soon became apparent that the existence of this section was of considerable value, and its work increased so that in August 1942 Mr. Sinclair was posted to S.L.B. as an additional officer and for a short time thereafter the section also had the assistance of Mr. Redfern.

It would take too long to give any indication of the number and variety of cases dealt with and it will perhaps suffice to say that all of the following cases of espionage were prepared for submission to the Director of Public Prosecutions by S.L.B.:-

Jose Waldberg
Carl Heinrich Meier
Charles Albert van den Kieboom
George Armstrong.
Karl Theo Drueke.
Werner Heinrich Walti.
Karel Richard Richter.
Johannes Marinus Dronkers.
Jose Estella Key
Alphons Louis Eugene Timmerman.
Duncan Alexander Croall Scott-Ford.
Franciscus Johannes Winter
Rogerio de Magalhaes Peixoto de Menezes
Oswald John Job.
Pierre Richard Charles Neukermans.
Joseph Jan van Hove.

When S.L.B.2. was formed the prosecution section became known as S.L.B.1.

Leakage of Information Section. In all wars, but particularly in modern wars, it is essential to keep secret the plan of campaign, the numbers and purpose of the forces to be employed and the weapons and devices which will be made use of. If information about these matters ceases to be secret and obtains a general circulation, valuable raw material is furnished to the spy. Moreover, innocent persons, whether British or foreign, who may be travelling out of the country, may, by passing on something they have heard quite innocently, give valuable information to the enemy. Of the various agencies employed in keeping secret what should be kept secret the Security Service was prominent both in an advisory and in an executive capacity. Thus there was in existence in December 1939 a section dealing with leakage of information under Mr. Maude of S.L.2. In April 1940

/this work

this work was discharged by a section known as B.19, of which Mr. Maude was in charge, he being assisted by Major Phipps. After the removal of the bulk of the Office to Oxford in October 1940 the work of this section lapsed to a considerable extent, but in February 1942 it was found necessary to revive and stimulate its activity and the section was renamed B.1.K. and transferred to the London Office, the personnel consisting of Mr. Machell and Miss Small.

At this time the functions of the section were briefly as follows:-

- (a) the investigation of cases where a leakage of information had come to notice;
- (b) the dealing with miscellaneous enquiries which were based partly on leakage or suspected leakage of information;
- (c) surveillance of persons in possession of secret information who were believed to be liable to disclose it;
- (d) liaison with other agencies working in this field - e.g. Postal and Telegraph Censorship, Press Censorship and the Security Officers of the various Government Departments;
- (e) preparation and distribution of the product of certain telephone checks which had been imposed on persons suspected of having acquired or endeavouring to acquire secret information;
- (f) liaison with all sections within the Office in connection with leakage of information matters - e.g. D.4, Regional Control and the R.S.L.O.s and the Operations Section.

The section worked in particularly close touch with S.L.B. and it was the task of the latter to advise as to the handling of various enquiries and in particular to ensure that these enquiries were made in such a way as to render it possible for criminal proceedings to be taken against offenders when necessary under either the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1939 or Regulation 3 of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939.

On May 1st 1943 the Director General transferred the work of B.1.K. to a new section of S.L.B. called S.L.B.2. under Lt. Colonel Cussen. Mr. Machell was transferred to other duties and Miss Small joined Lt. Colonel Cussen. The Director General in making this change had in mind the expansion of work in connection with leakage of information which was bound to arise during the course of the preparations for the invasion of Europe and its execution. It was clear that a good deal of executive action would be required and he desired to consolidate the investigation side with the legal side. It was laid down that

/all sections

all sections of the Office should refer every suspected case of leakage of information to S.L.B.2., who would be responsible for investigating the case, stopping the leakage and, where necessary, for reporting the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Home Office issued a circular to all police authorities requiring that before any proceedings were taken under D.R.3 the case should be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The Director sought the advice of the Security Service through S.L.B.2. before authorising or taking proceedings. This step was necessary, first in order to secure uniformity of treatment for these cases and second, in order to prevent proceedings being taken even in camera in those instances where the strict secrecy of the information in question would be further jeopardised by the hearing of a charge.

The section also became responsible for advising, and in grave cases for investigating, the loss of secret documents as this was one of the most dangerous sources of leakage.

In order to carry out an investigation the section called for the assistance of the following: the C.I.D. officers attached to the Security Service under Major Burt (B.5 section), the R.S.L.O.s and S.C.O.s and the various police forces through the R.S.L.O.s.

The investigating officer who is called upon to deal with a case of leakage of information must, if he is to do his work successfully, know the true facts about the subject concerned. If an army officer is said to have told his girl-friend the date for the invasion of North Africa, the investigating officer cannot handle the case unless he himself knows the date or sometimes the approximate date.

The section therefore worked in hourly contact with the Operations Section. This latter section assessed the gravity of the leakage from the operational point of view and considered with the leakage of information section the type of investigation required and the measures necessary to "close" the leakage. The investigating officer selected by S.L.B.2. was then fully briefed on the subject in question. It was the practice, where all highly secret matters were concerned, to entrust the investigation to a B.5. officer unless it was desirable for a particular reason that Lt. Colonel Cussen should deal with the case himself - e.g. where a high civil servant was concerned.

There is always a proper place for the "specialist" in investigation work, and experience showed that this is true where leakage of information is concerned. Not only was the leakage of information

/section

section enabled frequently to dismiss a case as a mere repetition of a 'canard' or rumour, but also, to the advantage of its work, it gained experience in differentiating between those who recklessly and dangerously revealed official information which they had and those who did so in an unguarded moment and in all innocence. The type of treatment required in each case was of course quite different. In addition the section acquired its own technique in conducting investigations. It learned that in almost every case it was essential to take statements in writing from informants in a formal way, and then to proceed back along the track indicated. As a general rule this resulted in the persons responsible for the leakage being confronted with such abundant proof of their misdeeds that they were prepared to admit them under caution.

It might also be mentioned that very valuable results were obtained time and time again by the imposition of a telephone check on informants and suspects who were about to be interviewed. They very often filled in gaps in the information by telephoning their friends and associates.

This brief survey can perhaps best be concluded by giving one or two examples of leakages or loss of documents which were investigated:-

(a) A high Admiralty official leaves a copy of the plan for the invasion of Sicily in a train. Investigation made by Lt. Colonel Cussen and Special Branch Metropolitan Police. Documents found by another passenger within three hours. Investigation completed within seven hours. A.D.N.I., who participated, concurred with Security Service in reporting to Chiefs of Staff Committee that the operation was not "compromised".

(b) An engineer employed on Operation Pluto (the oil pipeline to Europe) tells an army officer about its details in a hotel. The case investigated by a B.5. officer. Proceedings taken under D.R.3. in camera.

(c) An American naval officer tells those present at a private dinner party the main features of the plan for invading Europe. Case investigated by Lt. Colonel Cussen and G-2 CI SHAEP. Leakage effectively closed within twenty-four hours. Naval officer "returned" to the U.S.A.

(d) Two days before D-Day an accredited correspondent then on board a landing craft sends a message to his newspaper giving certain details as to the forthcoming landing. Owing to an error by SHAEP Censorship a number of such messages were allowed to reach their destination. Case investigated by Lt. Colonel Cussen

/and

and G-2 CI SHAEF and B.5. Censorship procedure corrected and advice given to Supreme Commander that any other remedial action would do more harm than good.

Renegades (S.L.B.3). From the commencement of the war the Security Service acquired information from various sources as to the activities of those British subjects who were in enemy and enemy-occupied territory and who were engaged in assisting the enemy in various ways.

So far as civilians were concerned the information was handled by the section of B Division dealing with Fascist activities and after the re-organisation of the Security Service by F.3.

Prisoners of war who had gone over to the enemy were the subject of reports by M.I.9. and these were dealt with by a section of B Division, B.4.A. under Major Whyte and later under Lt. Colonel Seymer, both of whom were assisted by Miss Barnes.

As the time for the invasion of the Continent drew near, consideration was given by the Home Office, the Law Officers and the Director of Public Prosecutions to the question as to how renegades should be dealt with. At a meeting presided over by the Attorney General the Security Service was asked to be responsible for the collection of evidence about these persons and to undertake the reporting of their cases to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Once France was overrun it became apparent that although the Security Service had provided the armies in the field with a "Warning List" containing the names of British renegades who should be apprehended, the burden of detail involved was too great for the Army Intelligence personnel, nor did their training equip them for preparing cases for prosecution in the British Courts.

At the request of Major General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (SHAEF), the Director General established an M.I.5. Liaison Section attached to SHAEF who were charged with the duty of investigating British renegade cases and collecting evidence in the field. The Director General at the same time amalgamated the section F.1, which by this time had relieved F.3 of civilian renegade work, with B.4.A., which was still dealing with prisoners of war. These two sections, together with the M.I.5. Liaison Section, were merged into a new section, S.L.B.3, which took over all renegade investigation both civilian and Service under the direction of Lt. Colonel Cussen.

Civilian cases have been dealt with by a sub-section under Mr. Shelford and, after his resignation, under Major Hughes; and Service cases by Lt. Colonel Seymer and latterly Major Patterson.

/This work

This work is still in progress and it is not possible at the present time to give a complete picture of what has been achieved. It may perhaps suffice to say that two civilians have been convicted of treason (Joyce and Amery), five civilians have been convicted of offences against Regulation 2(A) of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939, nineteen British, Colonial and Dominion Service personnel have been convicted of offences against the Army Act 1940, three British Service personnel have been convicted of offences against the Air Force Act 1940, and one soldier has been convicted of an offence against the Treachery Act 1940 (Schurch).

In addition a vast number of investigations have been made which will enable the Security Service in due course to present a comprehensive report on the whole of the suspected British renegades on the Continent.

Operations Section. The Operations Section was first formed in the autumn of 1940 as part of W Branch and its original charter was "to receive secret information particularly in regard to operations of the fighting Services through liaison officers and to examine communications with this object; also to test the security of Service establishments in which special work of operational value was being undertaken". At this time security relations between the operational authorities in the three Services and the Security Service were not satisfactorily integrated. Machinery was still being improvised, one of the component parts of this machinery being the Inter-Services Security Board on which there was a Security Service representative in the person of Major Lennox, who was at that time in charge of Room 055 at the War Office. The Inter-Services Security Board was responsible, under the direction of the J.I.C., for the security of military operations and the prevention of leakages in that connection. The Security Service was concerned if a leakage was suspected; and it was necessary for the Security Service to know the true facts regarding any matter in connection with which a leakage was alleged to have occurred in order that it might make enquiries on appropriate lines.

The main function of the Operations Section was one of liaison between the authorities responsible for Service operations of all kinds and different parts of the Security Service. The object was to keep the Security Service informed as and where necessary about operational matters and to keep the operational authorities informed as and where necessary of the results of measures of an investigational or preventive nature taken by the Security Service. These essential functions did not change although a new charter was drawn up to define them more exactly when the Security Service was re-organised in the summer of 1941 and this charter was revised in January 1942 and again in June 1944. The revisions were made to conform to developments in the war situation and to accord with the wishes of the J.I.C.

/In the

In the final charter it was stated that the Operational Sections would keep the Director General informed of those operational plans which had a security interest; operational being used in its widest sense and including not only military operations of war but cover and deception plans, military exercises, secret tests, trials and experiments and also the journeys of V.I.P.s (Very Important Personages). At the same time the duties of the section in giving information to the Director B Division, S.I.B.2. (the section dealing with leakages), other B Division sections, A.D.D., E Division and F Division were laid down. These instructions formalised practices which had developed since the previous charter had been framed.

The Operations Section occupied a special position in that it represented S.I.S. as well as the Security Service on the Inter-Services Security Board. It became responsible for liaison with S.I.S. on secret operational matters generally and was also put into direct touch with S.O.2. (later S.O.E.) to carry out the same duties as it was performing for S.I.S.

An unexpected development arose from the position thus created. "Combined Operations", the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry and S.I.S. were all engaged independently in minor operations which were conducted with great secrecy by all of them and without information being exchanged. The result was that the Security Service Operations Section came to be the only part of the machinery to which the possibility of clashes between these minor operations became known; and it was therefore asked to undertake the responsibility of seeing that such clashes did not take place. Arrangements were therefore made to ensure that the Operations Section was kept systematically informed by all parties. A secret map was prepared showing exactly all future operations which were being planned as well as a secret project list which showed in geographical order all projected secret operations throughout Europe and Africa which were planned in this country or about which information was available here. Three copies only were made and they were distributed every week to the head of S.I.S. and the head of the security branch of S.O.E., the third being retained in the Operations Section for use within the Security Service. These lists did not cover detailed military plans but all minor raids and airborne expeditions up to and including major operations such as the landings in North Africa and the final invasion of Normandy. It did not include normal bombing operations against the Continent.

The section was also responsible for seeing that any information coming to the knowledge of the Security Service or S.I.S., which might have operational significance, should be communicated promptly to the Intelligence Staff of the Service or Department concerned.

/When

When raids were planned on enemy-occupied territory the Operations Section was responsible for communicating to the Service or Department concerned any operational objectives of interest to the Security Service or S.I.S. such as the location of enemy intelligence stations or centres of communication. By this means arrangements were made to deal with objectives thus designated and to obtain information of interest to the Security Service and S.I.S.

The section was concerned as a liaison section with security arrangements connected with the development of plans for the "Overlord" operation and with the security arrangements for the various journeys abroad made by the Prime Minister.

In view of the detail involved in the various changes in the charter it is necessary to refer to the sectional report for a full statement of the work done by this section.

Research. In October 1941 the Director General formed "Research" as part of his staff and posted Mr. Curry to the appointment. The reports on the German Secret Services already mentioned were prepared in 1942 and 1944. Miscellaneous papers on South African problems and the security of Allied Secret Service operations in occupied Europe were written in 1943. After the report on the German Secret Service, 1942 had been compiled Mr. Curry suggested that arrangements should be made to bring together all the officers who were doing research work and to collate the results. It was intended to include not only those in the various parts of the Security Service such as B.I.A., B.I.B., B.I.C. and B.I.D., but also some in Section V, G.C. & C.S. and R.I.S. In consequence of the difficult relations with Section V which existed at that time this proposal was dropped after discussion with Colonel Vivian.

In 1943 the Director General lent Mr. Curry to S.I.S. to form Section IX on the condition that he continued the work of compilation in "Research". In the meanwhile Mr. Aikin-Sneath had temporarily joined "Research" and produced his report on the Enemy Alien Population in the United Kingdom (vide Bibliography No. 24).

Agents and the Press Section. (MS and MS/PS). It has always been the practice for a certain number of agents to be controlled by the officers of sections in B Branch or, later, B Division, but from the time when he joined the Security Service in 1931 and onwards Mr. Maxwell Knight specialised in the recruitment and direction of agents employed to penetrate the Communist Party of Great Britain and other Communist organisations in this country. From 1934, when B Branch became specifically responsible for investigating Fascist movements, the M Section (as this organisation is now called) was engaged in penetrating the British Union of Fascists and other Fascist bodies on similar lines. Early in 1938 the M Section was

/also

also entrusted with the employment of penetrative agents to obtain information about pro-German societies and groups in this country which had come under the influence of German propaganda and Nazi ideology. At the same time an attempt was made to employ M agents to obtain information about the sources of German intelligence which appeared to be associated with the organisations affiliated to the Auslands Organisation of the NSDAP established on British territory. All these desirable developments were seriously handicapped by lack of adequate finance. Until the late summer of 1939 the M Section consisted of one officer and one secretary and it employed fourteen agents, although six is regarded as the maximum number of agents to which an officer can give sufficient attention to produce good results. Shortly before the outbreak of war two further officers, one of whom had no experience, joined the section. Even after the outbreak of war Mr., now Major, Maxwell Knight was unable to obtain all the funds he thought necessary to enable him to cover the whole field allotted to him. In addition to penetrating the political organisations and movements mentioned above, he was expected to be in a position to provide agents to get into contact with individuals or groups of individuals suspected of being engaged in espionage.

In 1940 when B Branch, to which he then belonged, was overwhelmed with routine enquiries, Major Maxwell Knight improvised a body of five officers, one of whom was a woman officer, with experience in private life which made them suitable for dealing with some of the various interviews which arose out of these enquiries. They were frequently employed in connection with delicate cases in preference to reference to the Police. The experiment proved a success and the number of officers employed on this work was increased, but as the Security Service gradually settled down and obtained an ascendancy over the mass of work with which it had had to deal, they were gradually released after playing a valuable part in filling a gap in a difficult period.

At the time of the re-organisation in 1941 the M Section was left in B Division, but seventy-five percent of its agents were engaged in the work assigned to the newly formed F Division. The main development of B Division, virtually restricted as it now was to dealing with the Abwehr and its agents, was on lines which generally speaking diverged from those on which the 'M' type of agent could be employed. The separation of the M Section from B Division therefore followed - not illogically - in 1942.

Major Maxwell Knight, who has special qualifications and aptitudes and has devoted great care and attention to this very exacting branch of the work - the running of agents - has set down his views on the methods which should be adopted in the M Section (vide the sectional report S.F.50-24-44(8A)). They embody the results of long experience and are

/based

based on a number of successes in a highly specialised field. They therefore deserve study by other officers who may be concerned in this type of work. He stresses the importance of co-operation with the Police and of a full understanding of the differences of outlook between the Police and an intelligence department, as well as a comprehension of each other's difficulties.

Among the very large number of cases which have been dealt with in MS it may be mentioned that information was supplied which was directly responsible for the detention of forty-three individuals under Regulation 18B. Of these thirty were members of the B.U.F. and thirteen were cases of aliens suspected of activities prejudicial to the war effort. In addition information produced by MS was almost solely responsible for the discovery of the activities of Anna Wolkoff and Tyler Kent, Molly Hiscox and Norah Briscoe, Mrs. Sybil Nicholson, Mrs. Irma Stapledon and Rogeiro Menezes.

All these cases, except that of Mrs. Nicholson, ended in conviction and in all of them the Law Officers of the Crown commented favourably on the agents concerned - not only on their work as agents but on the manner in which they gave their evidence in Court. An account of the Anna Wolkoff and Tyler Kent case will be found in the sectional report. It is one of the most important on account of the nature of the information obtained by Tyler Kent from the American Embassy. This information was, in the main, not concerned with the domestic affairs of the United States, but could be of the greatest value to the enemy and cause incalculable harm to the Allies. Captain Ramsay and his Right Club, William Joyce and the Secretary of the Belgian Embassy were all, more or less incidentally, involved. Anna Wolkoff and Tyler Kent were sentenced to seven and ten years penal servitude respectively.

Major Maxwell Knight has emphasised the importance of long-term planning in dealing with the Soviet Intelligence Service which is remarkable for its thoroughness, patience and its own long-term work; and offers more serious problems than those with which the Germans have confronted us. This is a point of first-class importance for the future, with special reference to the conditions of counter espionage work in peace-time.

The sectional report contains two especially instructive accounts: the case of Percy Glading and that of Werner Osterwald, a pre-war German agent. The former has been mentioned in Chapter III above; the latter is a useful model to illustrate how results can be achieved by co-operation between a head office section directing the use of shadowers and other routine methods and the M Section employing an agent to make contact with a suspect.

/In 1940

In 1940 Mr. John Maude suggested to the Deputy Director of B Division that arrangements might be made for the systematic introduction of agents as domestic servants. The question was examined and it was found that this could most usefully be done in the case of foreign embassies and legations in London. After careful preliminary work a section for dealing with the subject was started in April 1941 under Mrs. Gladstone and Mr. Dickson, of whom the former had, in the meanwhile, examined the possibilities of working through
By July 1941 the section was in effective working order. It was developed with great skill and ingenuity and proved to be a valuable weapon in the hands of the Security Service for the purpose of obtaining information in a variety of ways for counter espionage work. The section worked in very closely with the B.I.G. and B.I.B. sections at Head Office dealing with the Embassy and Embassies and Legations with a view to countering the work of the German Secret Service.

An important principle followed by the section was to avoid suborning or seducing old employees. In preference to doing so they arranged that trained domestic servants of good character who had been recruited by us as agents should obtain employment in places of especial interest to us. These agents were not merely used to overhear conversations or to obtain the contents of diplomatic wastepaper baskets. They assisted in obtaining, or in putting other agents into a position which enabled us to obtain, documents and keys to ciphers.

Details regarding the South American Embassies and Legations covered by this section have been given in Chapter V, Part 1 (iv), (B.I.G.).

The representatives of other neutral countries also received close attention. Some of the cases brought out the fact that our agents worked for patriotic rather than mercenary motives and were willing to live under very unpleasant conditions - even in a filthy kitchen - in order to achieve the results desired of them.

At one time the war situation provided reasons for making it desirable to obtain access to the diplomatic cipher. The elaborate arrangements by which this operation was successfully carried out are described in the sectional report. They involved the identification of the cipher clerk through a domestic servant, arrangements to induce him to strike up a casual acquaintanceship in a cafe and the long-drawn out cultivation of this acquaintanceship in order to exploit his indulgence in the pastime of swimming which gave opportunities for the employment of a highly technical process of duplicating the keys. As a result of a series of intricate and ingenious arrangements, the Security Service was placed in the position of having access to the cipher whenever it might be considered desirable to do so as a matter of policy.

/It is

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

Nov '98

It is a tribute to the reputation of this section that it received more demands from other sections for arrangements to place agents than it was able to meet in spite of every effort, within reason, to expand its capacity.

The sectional report is of great interest, if only because it shows how a clear idea in planning and thoroughness in execution were combined with creative imagination, humour, irony and restraint to produce an unusual and very important piece of work.

The Press Section under Captain Tangye was responsible for the distribution of Press cuttings and, as a corollary, for obtaining information from and about journalists and about their sources of information on matters which appeared in the Press when they had a bearing on the work of sections of the Security Service. The work consisted of obtaining certain types of intelligence and did not usually fall within a strict definition of counter espionage or security. Some of the reports were furnished to the Cabinet Offices to whom they were of interest from a political point of view - for instance, when they supplied information about criticism of Government measures which was being voiced without being published. In that sense they were not far removed from security in war-time in the widest sense of the term. The position was a delicate and difficult one and could only be maintained as a war-time measure.

Another aspect of security relations with the Press was dealt with by Mr. S. Sheppard who was also Personal Assistant to the Deputy Director General. He was responsible for liaison with the Press Censorship through the Military Advisers to Censorship for the purpose of preventing the publication of anything which the Security Service considered undesirable. Press censorship was voluntary and neither the Security Service nor the Censorship had the power to stop the publication of anything; but they could recommend against publication and the Military Advisers were ready to accept our recommendations provided they were based on good security grounds and to ask the censors to advise the Press accordingly. These arrangements worked well in practice. Subjects dealt with included espionage cases, prosecutions under the Defence Regulations or the Official Secrets Act, internment cases, escapes and escape routes from enemy-occupied territory and rumours. Special precautions had to be taken to prevent the appearance of anything but the authorised facts about the arrival, arrest and trial of enemy agents.

Room 055, War Office. First under Major Lennox and later under Mr. Orr, Room 055 served as a liaison section between parts of the Security Service and the War Office in certain respects. It was also used as a convenient point for contact with the public where individuals wrote to the authorities about subjects coming within the sphere of the Security Service, or for other interviews with members of the public, if and when appropriate, by officers of the Security Service who were thus able to act under cover of the War Office.

/Overseas Control

Overseas Control. The term 'Overseas Control' which had come into use in September 1941 refers to control over administrative arrangements in London for the staff abroad, i.e. the Defence Security Officers in the Colonies. It does not imply any executive control over intelligence work done in colonial territories by the local authorities. The section is also responsible for liaison with the Dominions Security and Police Services.

At the outbreak of war in September 1939 the permanent establishment of the Security Service overseas consisted of six officers located at Gibraltar, Malta, Cairo, Aden, Singapore and Hong Kong. Each officer was provided with a small staff of military personnel loaned from the local Military Command and had built up in the years prior to the war considerable records concerning local personalities and organisations of security interest. Reports on these subjects and on the general state of internal security were forwarded to the Security Service in London, where they were distributed according to their content to the appropriate sections. In addition to this permanent overseas staff a system had been established whereby security information was exchanged between the Security Service and established honorary correspondents in the Dominions and Colonies, and it was customary for the Colonial Secretary or the Chief of Police to act in this capacity. From the administrative angle, however, the direction required and given from London entailed little work and required the part-time services of only one officer, who was also engaged in the administration of the Security Service staff in general.

For the first ten months of hostilities security measures in the Colonial Empire remained on a peace-time basis; and, although Colonial Governments were able to provide themselves with legislative powers under the Colonial Emergency Defence Regulations, generally equivalent to those obtaining in the United Kingdom, it was noticed that administrations were loath to recommend the taking of active preventive measures to secure their territories from enemy activities.

Following upon the success of enemy operations in Europe and the establishment of enemy submarine bases on the Atlantic seaboard, the likelihood of an intensification of the campaign against Allied shipping and the possibility of enemy agents being landed on Empire territory became matters of considerable concern to the Dominions and Colonies. It was therefore decided, after an approach by the Colonial Office, to increase the direct overseas representation of the Security Service. An immediate result was the appointment of a Defence Security Officer for East Africa in June 1941, and this step was followed by a steady increase in personnel so employed until the end of August 1945, when the total

/number

number of Security Service officers stationed overseas was twenty-seven, together with twenty-one secretaries despatched from London.

This increase in establishment led to both a considerable increase in the volume of administrative work handled by London and also in the number of enquiries of a general nature from overseas which could not be appropriately passed to London sections for action. At the time of the re-organisation in the summer of 1941 the section in the administrative branch of the Security Service under the Director A Division was given a charter by the Director General which read as follows:-

"In view of the increasing importance of security work in the Dominions and Colonies it is more than ever necessary that this work should be efficiently co-ordinated. For the guidance of officers, the following is a general summary of the responsibilities and functions of the Overseas Section of A Division:-

- (a) To be responsible for the general administration of Defence Security Officers (i.e. for those paid by the Security Service) in the Colonies - changes in personnel, finance, office details, etc.
- (b) To be the normal channel for liaison on general matters with Security Service links overseas (Dominions and Colonies); but not on investigations (which are conducted from beginning to end by the appropriate section of the Security Service).
- (c) To publish a periodical "Overseas Security Bulletin" giving D.S.O.s and links, S.C.O.s in the United Kingdom (through D.4) and I(B) officers serving overseas news of such events in the United Kingdom - legislation, action against subversive bodies or individuals and the like - as have a strictly security aspect and may therefore be taken as likely to "inform" Overseas officers. These Bulletins to include contributions from the D.S.O.s themselves or from Security Service links, as received from time to time, and to collate pertinent reports derived from Overseas Intelligence Centres.
- (d) To be the channel for liaison on Dominion and Colonial security matters with the Dominions and Colonial Offices, but not so as to affect any existing liaison between the Director "B" and those departments.
- (e) To represent the Security Service at relevant conferences with other departments, accompanied by, or representing the views of, those specialists within the Office whose work may be concerned with, or affected by, the terms of reference of such conferences.

- (f) To be up-to-date as to the state of Field Security Sections in the Colonies in liaison with M.I.11.
- (g) To "see", but not to take action on, correspondence with Dominions and Colonies on security matters, to be subsequently dealt with by the appropriate section, with a view to keeping a finger on the "pulse" of security work overseas.
- (h) To keep the Empire security machinery under review and, in frequent consultation with B Branch, to submit recommendations to the Director General on Security Service requirements based on reports received from all sources, and to keep Director "C" and "D" informed in the same way that Director "C" and "D" submits military security requirements to the War Office and keeps A.5 informed.
- (i) To pass at once to Director "C" and "D" any reports on intelligence of military interest received by the Security Service from Defence Security Officers overseas.
- (j) To maintain the closest touch with D Division on all matters pertaining to the development of security enterprises outside the United Kingdom, whether they are taking place in a theatre of operations or not."

In April 1943, in consequence of the development of overseas work and the increasing number of policy questions requiring his decision, the Director General attached Overseas Control to his personal staff.

The staff of the section in 1939 was one officer on part-time duties and the final strength was three officers and two Grade 1 assistants with a proportionate increase in secretarial staff.

Prior to the war a routine liaison was in operation between the administrative and investigation branches of the Security Service and the Colonial Office. With the development of the Security Service in the Empire and the consequent increase in the number of reports received both on the operation of security control and on political and general matters it was obvious that the contacts hitherto established should become appreciably closer.

Such matters as the coincidence of cables sent by the Colonial Office to the Governors and by the Security Service to their representatives, finance and selection of staff all had to be jointly considered and it was found possible as a result to produce joint statements on security matters at inter-departmental meetings which thus carried greater weight and achieved more satisfactory results.

/Naturally

Naturally with the close day-to-day contact established by Overseas Control with the Defence Department of the Colonial Office a stage was reached when it was found possible, without any jeopardising of the security of information, to exchange our views and material of mutual interest and thereby for the Security Service to have considerable forewarning of the likely official views of the Colonial Office on impending points of concern to ourselves and other departments with which the Security Service had joint interests. It cannot be too strongly stressed that this liaison was one of the most valuable means by which we were able to ensure the acceptance, even if not always in full measure, of the considerable number of policy recommendations made to the Colonial Office throughout the war period.

Following upon the withdrawal of the Defence Security Officer, Jamaica and a concurrent vacancy in the Defence Department of the Colonial Office with which the Security Service conducted its liaison, the Colonial Office asked us to assist them in filling their vacant appointment, and in view of his qualifications our former representative was selected. It is also interesting to note that following the resignation of this officer we were again approached with a view to providing a security trained officer, preferably with experience as a Defence Security Officer; unfortunately no such officer was immediately available.

Following this close contact it was also learnt that the information supplied by the Defence Security Officer was in fact of considerable value to the departments of the Colonial Office concerned with the individual territory and that an increase in the flow would be welcome since the Colonial Office did not feel that it would be a proper course for Governors, whose secretariat's security was not always of the highest order, to despatch reports on these matters to the Colonial Office. Consequently our representatives were invited to consult with their Governors as to the most suitable method of despatch to London of information of this nature and security cover was at the same time ensured in the Colonial Office.

The Colonial Office also, being impressed by the achievements and future possibilities of security and realising that the retention of Defence Security Officers on a war-time basis would not long be a practicable possibility, came to the conclusion that the early training of suitable candidates for post-war security work under the Colonial Commissioner of Police was advisable. Arrangements were therefore made by the Colonial Office with the Security Service, the Home Office Immigration Branch and the Metropolitan Police under which selected officers would be given a course of training in the United Kingdom to fit them for security work. On the return of these officers

/to their

to their territories their functions on behalf of security would be generally guided by a Security Service Officer located at some geographically convenient point in the area, who would be in close touch with London on the development of technique and general matters of security interest. The first steps in this scheme have been taken with the training of a member of the Trinidad Police Force, and it is hoped that on the return of Colonial Administrations to their peace-time basis this scheme will become a permanent arrangement.

With the progress of the war and the despatch of Defence Security Officers successively to East Africa, West Africa, Bermuda, Trinidad, the Leeward and Windward Islands, Ceylon, Jamaica, British Guiana, Newfoundland, Bahamas, British Honduras, the Islands Area of East Africa and, on their re-occupation, Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong, the duties which fell upon their shoulders became both greater in general scope and more specialised on counter espionage and counter sabotage matters.

Towards the end of 1941 a number of reports received by the Security Service and other departments in London connected with the lack of security precautions in South Africa, taken in conjunction with the rising number of sinkings of merchant ships routed round the Cape, proved the need for special security arrangements and advice by a trained Security Officer. It was therefore agreed that an experienced Port Control Officer from the United Kingdom should visit the Union and advise the Union Departments on measures necessary to ensure the security of ports and harbours and to prevent the leakage of information. As a result of this officer's recommendations the Union Government requested the Director General to provide an officer who, while nominally on the staff of the British Military Mission, would be available to them to initiate a port control organisation and to advise them on matters of security intelligence in general.

The detailed record of relations with the different Dominions and Colonies will be found in the Sectional Report (vide S.F.50-24-44(11)).

(v) The Director General's review of the war period.

From December 1943 Mr. Eden became personally responsible for the Security Service. This change was made as the result of a suggestion by Mr. Duff Cooper when he relinquished the appointment of Chairman of the Security Executive, to the effect that it should be attached to one of the great Departments of State and specifically to the Foreign Office. Accordingly, when it became clear that the Allied Expeditionary Forces had been landed in Normandy without the enemy obtaining intelligence

/of the

of the exact nature of the strategical plan employed against him or of the timing of the operation, the Director General addressed a letter to Mr. Eden on the 26th June 1944 in which he reviewed the part played by the Security Service from the beginning of the war and of the part which it still aimed at contributing towards its completion.

At this early date Sir David Petrie was able to mention that there was good reason to believe that the deception carried out through the controlled double agents was having the effect of pinning down and keeping in situ German forces which would otherwise have been concentrated against the Normandy bridgehead. He added that the completeness of the German confidence in these agents had been recently shown by a strong recommendation for the reward of the Iron Cross to one of these men who was the third of those under our control to be so "honoured".

In conclusion he made the following remarks:-

"It is now considered by the Imperial General Staff that there is clear evidence to show that 'the timing of our attack on Normandy was a complete surprise to the enemy'. This has resulted from the combined efforts of the various Services and Agencies which have been working hard and long on the security side of the operation. The role of the Security Service has been peculiarly important and peculiarly difficult. In the end security has meant the prevention of the enemy's getting advance information of our plans. His most likely means was his spy organisation and it has failed him. If it had not, it would have been on the Security Service that the chief responsibility would have rested. If their work had been bad, no amount of good work in other quarters would have compensated for it. It must be made clear, however, that the contribution they have made to Overlord security is not the result of a recent intensive effort. Rather it is the crown and reward of sleepless and unflagging vigilance during the whole long course of the war. It is now fully evident that for many months past these islands have been swept clean, and kept clean, of enemy agents. This has been an initial and incalculable advantage in the working of the whole of the security system devised to protect the security of Overlord.

In doing what they have done, the Security Service has done no more than its duty. It is only fair to them, however, to recognise that their job has been an exceptionally difficult and chancey one and that they have done it supremely well. It is very desirable that this should be remembered, since it is one of the discouragements inseparable from security work that the better it is done the less there is to show for it.

/It is

It is not too much to say that the contribution of the Service to the nation during the defensive stage of the war has been an asset of the highest value. The Service is not without its critics and detractors, though it is but rarely that any of them is other than ill-informed. It has special duties and functions which can be performed only by itself, or by some similarly constituted service, although in not a few outside quarters the idea is held that this is not so. Therefore whatever innovations may be thought of after the war, it should not be forgotten that the Service, throughout a long period of national emergency, has done the work for which it exists and has done it with complete success. It has been tried and not found wanting.

I trust that no part of my testimony in favour of the Security Service will be discounted as being that of the present Head of it and so of no unbiased witness. As a matter of fact my position is one of almost complete detachment. I had retired from Government service before I joined it and as a "dug-out" have no official future in the Service after the war has been won. In the course of re-organising it and directing it for three and a half strenuous years, I have perhaps said more hard things of the Service than almost anyone else. Before I disappear, therefore, I would like to place on record that the Security Service has deserved well of the Nation, which, as coming from one circumstanced as I am, may be accepted without the least suspicion of bias."

Events during the subsequent course of the war until VE Day on the 8th May 1945 confirmed the validity of these general conclusions and showed that the Security Service could make further important contributions as has been described above in the sections dealing with B.I.A. and its double agents and with the War Room and its service to the G-2 CI Staff of SHAEP. The War Room linked the Security Service directly with the complementary organisation in the field which shared its responsibilities for combating the enemy Secret Services and their agents. The successes achieved by the Security Service before and after the Normandy landing were made possible by the denial of intelligence to the enemy and by the fact that he was unable to establish a single good agent in a position to give him the essential information which might have enabled his General Staff to retrieve errors imposed on them by their own and Hitler's confidence in the reports prepared under the instructions of the Allied Staffs and transmitted to them through B.I.A.

If these successes were in the main ensured by the interception of the enemy's communications (by R.S.S. and G.C. & C.S.) supported, interpreted and enlarged by information obtained by interrogation (at the ports, the L.R.C. and Camp 020) they were made doubly sure by the thorough and elaborate measures taken to cover every possible loophole through which the enemy might have infiltrated or

/otherwise

otherwise have obtained vital intelligence; that is by the security measures taken over a long period both in the Security Service and by other authorities.

(vi) The lessons from the past.

It may be a trite saying that the successes and failures of the past should serve the purposes of instruction for the future, but they enforce the lesson that effective counter espionage is far less easy to achieve in time of peace; and they indicate that the Security Service faces, after the successes achieved against Germany, one of the most difficult periods in its history. The immediate future would seem to call for a compact organisation, based on a sound allocation of functions, with a clear conception of its objectives and the means of reaching them. Above all it must be able to turn to the appropriate authority for crucial decisions on policy and to present its case effectively in times of crisis.

If it is to avoid unnecessary friction and the consequent waste of time, energy and talent, it must be remoulded, as occasion demands, in accordance with the principles applicable to all creative work. It must obey the laws of the conservation of energy and abide by the cardinal principle of Occam's razor - *entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem* - which governs all scientific investigation as well as the production of a work of art. It must employ to the best advantage its human material and put its square pegs in square holes. The principle of the allocation of functions must be applied both internally and externally. Internally there must be a proper balance and a full understanding between the parts responsible for investigation, prevention, deception and organisation. The same principles of balance and understanding hold good in respect of the relations between the executive in its dealings with foreign agents; research and analysis in the presentation, in the most suitable ad hoc form, of the records about those agents and the instruments of the foreign powers employing them; and the more mechanical structure of the Registry as a vehicle of intelligence. Externally the Security Service must find its proper place in the machinery of government under the Minister of Defence to enable it to play its part in an integral process in conformity with the requirements of this Age of Science.

It would not be appropriate to attempt a detailed plan for the future as an appendage to this record of the facts; but in order to explain the question of the practical application of the principles just mentioned more clearly it is desirable to describe in outline the general nature of the organisation which seems to be prescribed by the lessons of the past.

/To enable

To enable the Director General to discharge his responsibilities with the greatest possible degree of efficiency the internal form and external relations of the organisation should be based on the principle of the "simplicity postulate". This suggests the following proposals:-

1) The whole of the machinery under the Director General charged with responsibility for counter espionage, i.e. for combating an enemy secret service, should consist of three Divisions, each under a Director, with responsibilities for -

(a) maintaining the Security Service as an efficient instrument to enable it to perform its functions (A Division);

(b) the investigation of cases against individual agents, for obtaining intelligence about the organisation behind them and for using all the products for the purposes of deception (B Division); and

(c) prevention in the fullest sense of the term, including all the present functions of C and D Divisions and internment policy (but not the investigation of the cases of individual internees or candidates for internment in wartime - as this falls to B Division), i.e. prevention, including measures to restrict opportunities for espionage (and sabotage) by all feasible means (C and D Divisions).

2) The Director General should be directly responsible to the Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet and to the Assistant (Military) Secretary and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence and through them to the Prime Minister, with the recognised function of taking or recommending measures to ensure co-ordination, within the sphere of his own responsibilities, between the organisation under the Chiefs of Staff on the one hand and the Home Office, the Foreign Office and other interested Services and Departments on the other.

3) The functional relations between the Security Service and S.I.S. should be governed by the following principles:-

(a) All counter espionage intelligence should be recorded, carded and indexed by one Registry under the control and direction of the Director of A Division of the Security Service.

(b) The function of Section V of S.I.S. should be to obtain from abroad all the intelligence required by the Security Service for counter espionage purposes by other than open means, including the penetration of organisations in foreign countries. (To assist in this Section V should have access to all the intelligence at the disposal of the Security Service).

The Passport Control Officers abroad should cease to be employed for S.I.S. purposes. Their passport and visa work is an essential part of the defensive machinery of the Security Service and it places them in a good position to act in liaison between it and the Security Services of friendly governments to which they are accredited. Clandestine work by S.I.S. should be conducted through an entirely separate agency.*

(c) The Director General of the Security Service should have facilities for and control over all measures for developing the interception of enemy (or potential enemy) communications, including wireless; and the financial powers to develop the necessary resources in accordance with the requirements arising out of his responsibilities. Under present circumstances this could best be provided by his having a seat on the "Sigint" Board with an effective voice in the control of grants allocated for interception for counter espionage purposes.

(d) It should be the function of an officer (or officers) under the Director General to collate all 'straight' intelligence available in British territories as obtained by different sections, to co-ordinate measures for obtaining it, to communicate it to S.I.S. for collation, and to communicate it to the Foreign Office and other interested Services and Departments. (This should include intelligence such as that obtained by a Security Service agent inside the German or other Embassies in London and intelligence about the organisations and instruments of foreign powers on British soil such as the - extinct - Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP or the British Communist Party as a section of the Comintern, or Mosley's B.U.F. as the subsidised agency of Mussolini).

4) The functional relations between the Security Service and the I(B) Staff in the field are governed by the fact that - while the detection of enemy agents in the zone of operations and in British territory are complementary parts of an integral process which must be based on the Security Service records and its trained staff - the staff in the field must be subordinated to the Commander in Chief of the operations.

* The fact that some foreign security services will not exchange information as freely with S.I.S. as with the Security Service is a strong practical reason for the liaison being direct and not through S.I.S. in such cases.

Above all it should be laid down, if necessary with the authority of the Committee of Imperial Defence - who have not formally reviewed the position since 1908 - that the Security Service is not a secret political police, but is primarily an instrument for military purposes under the control of the Defence Minister and the Chiefs of Staff and subject to the direction, within their respective spheres, of the Secretaries of State for Home and Foreign Affairs and other members of the Cabinet. It is not, in this capacity, a purely advisory body, but has executive functions and responsibilities not covered by any other part of the executive machinery. It is not concerned with British political parties or "subversive movements" as such, but it is concerned when they are the instruments of foreign powers or are financed or subsidised by, or use conspiratorial methods in collusion with, the agencies of such powers in action which may be directed in furtherance of their political or military aims. (As a corollary, it should not investigate other matters or movements, such as the Trotskyists, except with the express approval of the Minister of Defence and the Home Secretary).

These latter - enquiries about British political parties as instruments of foreign powers - are its secondary purposes. They are those of an intelligence organisation and generally speaking involve action of an advisory nature. They are matters of 'straight' intelligence as well as of measures for countering foreign secret service organisations.

Once the functions and responsibilities of the Security Service had been clearly defined and its place in the machinery of government had been recognised in a positive form on these lines, the maintenance and application of these principles would be the day-to-day work of the Directorate whose task would become simpler with each step taken to define and clarify its position.

THE END

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

LIST OF DIVISIONAL AND SECTIONAL REPORTS

APPENDIX I

LIST OF DIVISIONAL AND SECTIONAL REPORTS.

- S.F.50-24-44(1) PA/DDG - Press Censorship.
 (2) Secretariat.
 (7) Operations Section.
 (8A) M.S. (Agents).
 (8B) M.S. Domestic Agency.
 (11) Overseas Control.
 (12) B Division Representative in Canada and U.S.A.
 (15) A.D.A. - Administrative Services.
 (16) Women's Establishment.
 (17) Regional Organisation.
 (18) Registry.
 (23) B.1.A. - Double Agents.
 (24A) B.1.B. - ISOS Material and Counter Espionage
 Methods in Gibraltar.
 (24B) B.1.B. - Mr. Hart's Reports.
 (26) B.1.B. - Diplomatic Section.
 (28) B.1.B. - Financial & Currency Enquiries.
 (30) B.1 Information.
 (31) B.1.C. - Counter Sabotage.
 (32) B.1.D. and B.1.D.-U.K. - L.R.C.
 (34) B.1.E. - Camp 020.
 (35) B.1.G. - Spain, Portugal & S. America.
 (36) B.1.H. - Ireland.
 (37) B.1.I. - Counter Espionage among Seamen and the
 Personnel of Air Lines.
 (40) B.3.C. - Suspected Communication with the Enemy.
 (41) B.3.A. and B.3.D. - Censorship.
 (42) B.3.E. - Signals Security.
 (43) B.4.B. - Enemy Espionage in Industry & Commerce.
 (45) B.6. - Shadowing Staff.
 (47) B.10. - Preliminary Investigation of Cases of
 German Espionage in the U.K.
 (50) C Division - Vetting.
 (53) D.1. - Security Measures.
 (54) D.2. - Liaison with the Admiralty.
 (55) D.3. - Liaison with the Air Ministry & M.A.P.
 (56) D.4. - Port and Travel Control.
 (57) D.5. - Liaison with the War Office.
 (58) D.6. - Protected Places and Areas.
 (59) Arrangements for compiling the History of
 D.1., D.2., D.3., and D.6.
 (60) E Division - Alien Control.
 (61) E.1.A.-F. - French Nationals.
 (62) E.1.A.-B. - Belgians.
 (63) E.1.A.-S. - Norwegians, Danes & Dutch.
 (64) E.1.A.-U.S.A. - Americans.
 (65) E.1.B. - Alien Seamen.
 (66) E.2.A. - Finns, Poles & Baltic States Nationals.
 (67) E.2.B. - Hungarian & Balkan Nationals.
 (68) E.3. - Swiss and Swedes.
 (69) E.4. - A.W.S. Department.
 (70) E.5. - Germans, Austrians and Czechs.
 (71) E.6. - Italians.
 (74) F Division - Subversive Activities.
 (75) F.1.A. - Internal Security in H.M. Forces.
 (76) F.2.A. - Communism, Trotskyism and other
 British Left Wing Subversive Activities.
 (77) F.2.B. - Comintern Activities & Communist Refugees.
 (78) F.2.C. - Russian Intelligence.
 (79) F.3. - Fascist, Pacifist & Nationalist Movements.
 (81) The C.I. War Room.

A P P E N D I X I I

ORGANISATIONAL CHARTS

SECURITY SERVICE

ORGANISATION CHARTS

JULY 1941.

DIVISIONAL ORGANISATION

Director General's Staff

Secretariat (SEC.)

Mr. Abbot

Director General (D.G.)
Brig. Sir David PETRIE.

Deputy Director General (D.D.G.)
Brig. O. A. HARKER.


Legal Advisers (S.L.)
Mr. Pilcher (S.L.A.)
Mr. Hale
Lt.-Col. Hinchley-Cooke (S.L.B.)

Operations (O.P.)
Maj. Lennox
Room 055 W.O.
Mr. Orr

<u>A. Division</u>	<u>B. Division</u>	<u>C. Division</u>	<u>D. Division</u>	<u>E. Division</u>	<u>F. Division</u>
ADMINISTRATION AND REGISTRY	ESPIONAGE	EXAMINATION OF CREDENTIALS	SECURITY AND TRAVEL CONTROL	ALIEN CONTROL	SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
Director (D.A.) Lt.-Col. Butler	Director (D.B.) Capt. G. Liddell	Director (D.C. & D.) Brig. Allen		Dep. Dir (D.D.E.) Mr. T. Turner	Dep. Dir. (D.D.F.) Mr. J. H. Curry
Dep. Dir. Organisation (D.D.O.) Mr. R. Horrocks	Asst. Dir. (A.D.B.1.) Mr. D. G. White	Deputy C (Dy.C.) Major Bacon	Deputy (Dy.D.) Lt.-Col. Norman	Asst. Dir. (A.D.E.1.) Maj. Younger	Asst. Dir. (A.D.F.2) Mr. R. H. Hollis
Asst. Dir. (A.D.A.) Maj. Cumming	Asst. Dir. (A.D.B.3.) Major Frost				Asst. Dir. (A.D.F.3.) Mr. Alkin Sneath

A. DIVISION
ADMINISTRATION AND REGISTRY

Director: Lt.-Col. Butler




B. DIVISION

ESPIONAGE

.....

Director: Captain G.M.Liddell

(Under control of
(Dir.B.
(B.5. Investigation
Staff - Supt.Burt
(B.6. Watchers
- Mr.
(P.S. Press Section
- Capt.Tangye




THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

Nov 98

C. DIVISION
EXAMINATION OF CREDENTIALS

Director: Brig. Allen
Deputy C.: Major Bacon



Capt. Strong


Capt. Stone (London)
Capt. Johnston (Country)

Mr. Sams

D DIVISION
SECURITY AND TRAVEL CONTROL

Director: Brig. Allen
Deputy Dir.: Lt.-Col. Norman

(Deals also with:
(Policy on Military Security
(Control of Photography
(Protected Areas and Places
(Advice on Passes, Permits
(Special Enquiries re Individuals




E DIVISION
ALIEN CONTROL

Dept. Director: Mr. Turner -----
Asst. Director: Major Younger

(Lindley Committee
Aliens on Suspect Lists.
- Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Mitchell
Officer in Charge




+ temporarily

F. DIVISION

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Deputy Director: Mr. Curry



SECURITY SERVICE

ORGANISATION CHARTS

APRIL 1943.

DIVISIONAL ORGANISATION

SECRETARIAT (SECTT.)

Mr. D. C. H. ABBOT

PRIVATE SECRETARY TO D.G. (PS/DG)

Mr. R. BUTLER

Director General (D.G.)


BRIG. SIR DAVID PETRIE

Deputy Director General (D.D.G.)

BRIG. O. A. HARKER

D.G. STAFF

See separate Chart




THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

Nov '98

A DIVISION

ADMINISTRATION AND REGISTRY

Director (D.A.)—Colonel A. C. P. BUTLER



THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

Nov 98.

B. DIVISION

ESPIONAGE

Director: Capt. G. M. LIDDELL
Deputy Director: Mr. D. G. WHITE

Under control Dir. B.:

B.5 Investigation Staff
Supt. L. BURT
B.6 Watchers
Mr

Asst. Director:
Maj. M. A. FROST (A.D.B.S)

B.1.A Special Agents Lt.-Col. T. A. ROBERTSON	B.1.B Special Sources Case Officers Mr. H. L. A. HART	B.1.H Ireland Mr. C. LIDDELL	B.3.A Censorship Reception Analysis Distribution of Material Preliminary Investigations Mr. R. E. BIRD	B.4.A Escaped Prisoners of War and Evaders Identification & Interrogation Maj. J. R. WHYTE	B.3.B Illicit Wireless Investigations R.S.S. Liaison Mr. R. L. HUGHES
B.1.L Espionage through Merchant Shipping Crews & Personnel of Air Lines Mr. J. R. STOPFORD	B.1.C Sabotage and Espionage Inventions and Technical Lord ROTHSCHILD		B.3.D Censorship Liaison Mr. A. GROGAN		B.3.C Lights and Pigeons Flt.-Lt. R. M. WALKER
	B.1.D London Reception Centre Maj. H. J. BAXTER				
	B.1.E Camp 020 and 020R. Lt.-Col. R. W. G. STEPHENS				
	B.1.G Spanish, Portuguese and S. American Espionage Mr. R. BROOMAN WHITE				
	B.4.B Espionage, Industry and Commerce Mr. J. G. CRAUFURD				

* For administrative matters the Officer in charge Camps 020 and 020R is responsible directly to D.A.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.


Nov '98.

C. DIVISION

EXAMINATION OF CREDENTIALS

Director: Brig. H. I. ALLEN

Assistant Director: Lt.-Col. H. H. BACON




* R.A.F. and M.A.P. cases are dealt with in conjunction with D.3.

D. DIVISION

SERVICES, FACTORY AND PORT SECURITY.
TRAVEL CONTROL.


Director: Brig. H. I. ALLEN



E. DIVISION

ALIEN CONTROL


Assistant Director: Capt. S. P. BROOKE BOOTH



F. DIVISION

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Assistant Director: Mr. R. H. HOLMES



BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. 'A' Branch Report (Held A.4). *Now R8*
2. Die Auslands Organisation der N.S.D.A.P. by Dr. Emil Ehrlich (Filed in O.F.22-1, volume 42, 1808x).
3. Note on the Auslands Organisation of the National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei - 1935 by J.C. Curry (Held A.4).
4. Additional Note on the Auslands Organisation of the National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei - 1937 by J.C. Curry (Held A.4).
5. Amt Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr by G.C. & C.S. (Filed in S.F.50-24-44 Supp. B).
6. The British Union of Fascists - July 1941 by F.B. Aikin-Sneath (Held A.4).
7. The Betrayal of the Left - An examination and refutation of Communist Policy from October 1939 to January 1941 with suggestions for an alternative and an epilogue on political morality (Copy in Library).
8. Committee of Imperial Defence - War Emergency Legislation Sub-Committee - Handbook and Index of the principal British legislation and special powers for war and civil emergency December 1931 (Held A.4).
9. Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence appointed to consider the Question of Foreign Espionage in the United Kingdom 1909 (Filed in S.F.50-15-26).
10. Committee of Imperial Defence - Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. Nazi and Fascist Party Organisations and Activities in British Territory (Filed in S.F.66-U.K.-63A).
11. Communism in Great Britain To-day - June 1932 (Held A.4).
12. Communism (General Aspects) - April 1934 (Held A.4).
13. Communism (Organisation & Working) - December 1934 (Held A.4).
14. The Communist Party - Its Aims & Organisation - April 1945 (Held A.4).
15. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (Copy in Library).
16. Communist Party of Great Britain - Paper prepared for the Home Secretary to submit to the Cabinet - 1943 (Filed in S.F.91-1-2 link).
17. Communist Party of Great Britain - Minutes of the Meetings of the Central Committee (Held A.D.F.).
18. Short Thesis of the Comintern (included in 17 above).
19. Note on Information received in connection with the Crisis of September 1938 (Filed in S.F.50-24-44 Supp. B).
20. 'D' Branch Report (Held A.4). *Now R8*
21. Distribution of Duties - I.P. Book No. 9 November 1918 (Held A.4).
22. Draft Defence Regulations 1939 Code A (Held A.4).
23. Draft Defence Regulations 1939 Code AB (Held A.4).
24. Enemy Alien Population in the U.K. by F.B. Aikin-Sneath (Held A.4).
25. Enemy Sabotage Equipment (Technical) 1942 by B.I.C. (Held A.4).
26. 'E' Branch Report (Held A.4). *Now R8*
27. War Office Branch Memorandum on Espionage in time of peace - 1909 (Filed in S.F.50-15-26).
28. 'F' Branch Report (Held A.4). *Now R8*
29. Game Book (Held A.4). " "
30. 'G' Branch Report (Held A.4). " "
31. Manual on the German Secret Services and British Counter-Measures - June 1944 by J. Gwyer (Held A.4).
32. Report on the German Secret Service or Abwehr up to March 1942 by J.C. Curry (Filed in S.F.52/4/4/10 link)
33. The German Secret Service - August 1942 by J.C. Curry (Held A.4).

34. Supplement to the Report on the German Secret Service issued in August 1942 by J.C. Curry (Held A.4).
35. The German Intelligence Service - April 1945 by the War Room (Filed in S.F.50-24-44 Supp. B).
36. The German Police System as applied to Military Security in War - Compiled by the General Staff, War Office 1921 (Held A.4).
37. Grundlagen Aufbau und Wirtschaftsordnung des National Sozialistischen Staates (Copy in Library).
38. Summary of Information relating to German Propaganda in the United Kingdom (Filed in S.F.55-Germany-3A).
39. The German Secret Service - December 1940 by D.G. White (Filed in S.F.50-24-44 Supp. B).
40. 'H' Branch Report (Held A.4). *now R8.*
41. The Home Office by Sir Edward Troup, K.C.B., K.C.V.O. (Copy in Library).
42. Lord Hankey's Report on the Security Service - May 1940 (Filed in S.F.50-24-9).
43. Historical Sketch of the Directorate of Military Intelligence during the Great War 1914-1918 (Filed in S.F.51-30-8).
44. Note on the Organisation and Activities of the Italian Fascist Party in the United Kingdom, the Dominions and Colonies - 1936 (Held A.4).
45. Additional Notes on the Organisation and Activities of the Italian Fascist Party in the United Kingdom, the Dominions and Colonies - 1937 (Held A.4).
46. The Italian Intelligence Service by Section V dated 15th July 1943 (Filed in S.F.50-24-44 Supp. B).
47. Lectures by Sir Vernon Kell (Held A.4).
48. History of the Post Office Investigation Branch up to the end of the War 1914-1918 (Filed in S.F.50-24-44 Supp. B).
49. Work of the Registry - I.P. Book 11 (Held A.4).
50. Chronological List of Staff taken to 31st December 1919 - I.P. Book No. 39 (Held A.4).
51. The Search for Evidence of Secret Graphic Communication - November 1943 by Professor H.V.A. Briscoe (Held A.4).
52. Memorandum on the Possibilities of Sabotage by the Organisations set up in British Countries by the Totalitarian Governments of Germany and Italy (Filed in S.F.66-U.K.-63A).
53. Soviet Communism by Sidney and Beatrice Webb (Copy in Library).
54. The Unofficial Shop Stewards Movement - November 1941 (Held A.4).
55. Die Wehrpolitische Revolution des National Sozialismus by Von Major Walter Jost (Filed in S.F.50-24-44 Supp. B).
56. War Office War Book - 1939 (Held D.D.G.).
57. War Office Emergency Legislation Committee - First Interim Report (Held A.4).
58. Wireless, Notes on the Detection of Illicit (Filed in S.F.50-24-44(39)).

I N D E X

INDEX

This is mainly a subject index; and is prepared on a selective basis only.

- Administration & Records Branch or Division, p. 34 and see contents sheets.
- Admiralty (Director of Naval Intelligence), p. 25, 27, 34, 41, 115, 146, 191, 229, 237, 310, 311, 312, 385, 388.
- 'Advisory capacity' of M.I.5., p. 12, 12x, 40, 404.
- Aircraft Production, Ministry of, p. 314.
- Air Ministry (Air Intelligence), p. 34, 115, 146, 191, 229, 230, 310, 311, 313, 388.
- Aliens Control, p. 294, 299, 308.
- Aliens Order, p. 194, 206, 209, 294.
- Aliens Restriction Act, p. 33.
- Aliens War Service Department (& Permits), p. 297, 299, 309.
- Americans, liaison with, p. 15, 107, 274, 275, 295, 328 et seq., 366, 375, 385, 386.
- Arrival from Enemy or Foreign Territory Order, p. 197, 198.
- Bacteriological Warfare, p. 224.
- B.B.C., p. 282.
- Board of Trade, p. 251.
- Brazilian revolution, Comintern and, p. 71, 72.
- British Union of Fascists, p. 6, 9, 11, 20, 77, 83, 84, 85, 118, 121, 130, 131, 140, 143, 152, 159, 261, 300, 301-06, 307, 389, 391.
- Cabinet, p. 5, 9, 101, 224, 246, 265, 273, 311, 321, 322, 347, 393.
- Camp 020, p. 12, 13, 150, 159, 179, 181, 182, 189, 190, 206, 207-213, 223, 259, 263, 288, 293, 377, 400.
- Canada, p. 82.
- Carding policy, see Index. 7.15
- Censorship, p. 14, 94, 125, 230, 244, 275, 351, 365, 383, 386, 393.
- Chemical specialists, p. 116, 365.
- Chiefs of Staff, p. 120, 273, 311, 322, 404.
- 'Civil security', p. 312, 336.
- Clausewitz, p. 5.
- Colonial Office } p. 10, 14, 15, 40, 81, 82, 191, 394 et seq.
- Colonies }
- Comintern, p. 8, 20, 22, 116, 137, 342, 350 et seq., 403 and see contents sheet.
- Comintern and Brazilian revolution, p. 71, 72.
- Comintern finance, p. 72.
- Comintern, Political Commission of, p. 71.
- Comintern (Secret Military Section of), p. 70, 71.
- Committee of Imperial Defence, p. 5, 9, 26, 32, 35, 80, 81, 116, 117, 123, 404.
- Communism } p. 2, 11, 20, 22, 114, 176, 323, 389;
- Communists } see contents sheet.
- Communist International, see Comintern.
- Communists, scientific and technical experts, p. 349.
- Constitutional Research Association, p. 304.
- Cryptography (G.C. & C.S.), p. 116, 156, 157, 174, 182, 183, 185, 186, 192, 222, 223, 230, 245, 272, 288, 291, 351, 377, 400.
- Customs, p. 27.
- Czechs, liaison with, p. 137.
- Deception, p. 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 39, 120, 134, 181, 227-241, 260.
- Defence Minister, p. 120, 401, 404.
- Defence of the Realm Regulations, p. 32.

Defence Regulations, p. 13, 123, 194, 197, 198, 209, 228, 301, 304, 308, 325, 386.

Democratic centralism, p. 56.

Department of Overseas Trade, p. 252.

Dictatorship of the proletariat, p. 56.

Diplomatic Allied & neutral representatives, p. 244-46, 264.

Director of Public Prosecutions, p. 212.

Directorate of Military Intelligence, p. 5, 32, 33, 34, 35, 68, 104, 120, 191, 192, 229, 237, 248, 311.

Directorate of Military Operations (or War Office), p. 5, 24, 25, 31, 32, 35, 318, 388.

Directors of Intelligence, p. 13, 19.

Domestic servants as agents, p. 392 et seq.

Dominions) p. 10, 14, 15, 40, 81, 82, 92, 273, 394

Dominions Office) et seq.

Double cross agents, p. 39, 134, 158, 174, 193, 221, 222, 227-241, 260, 262, 288, 289, 295, 300, 400.

Double cross agents, financing of, p. 235 et seq.

Eire, German agents in, p. 127, 152, 249, 266, 267, 270, 271.

Eire, liaison with, p. 105, 153, 244, 264-274.

Electricity undertakings, security of, p. 115.

"Enemy Alien Population in the U.K., The", p. 124, 128.

Executive power to refuse leave to land under Aliens Order, position of S.C.O., p. 196.

Factory security, p. 114, 115.

Fascio, Italian, p. 11, 20, 22, 110-112, 115, 141, 300.

Fascism) p. 2, 110-112, 115, 131, 301 and see under

Fascists) British Union of Fascists and Italian Fascism.

Federated Press of America case, p. 63, 64.

"Fifth column", p. 6, 7, 20, 22, 83, 84, 118, 119, 120, 122, 125, 130, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 148, 150, 152, 154, 159, 173, 176, 227, 282, 283, 297, 298, 299, 300, 304, 305.

Finance and Currency enquiries, p. 244, 246-248.

Foreign Office (Foreign Secretary), p. 9, 14, 67, 68, 83, 87, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 169, 237, 238, 285, 404.

Fortitude, Plan, p. 238, 239.

Fourth International, p. 358 et seq.

French, liaison with, p. 15, 227, 330, 331.

Functions, Chapter I throughout and p. 402-404.

German Consuls, p. 46, 88.

German espionage methods, p. 24, 26, 27, 39, 45, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 214, 218, 219, 239, 241, 242, 246, 247, 249, 267.

German General Staff (OKW), p. 24, 28, 41, 43, 45, 89, 125, 181, 182, 186, 214, 239, 250.

German journalists, p. 46, 101, 103, 121.

Hankey, Lord, p. 9, 123, 133, 266.

Home Defence Executive, p. 13, 229, 230, 237, 242, 273, 286.

Home Forces, 229.

Home Office (Home Secretary), p. 2, 8, 9, 14, 21, 30, 35, 41, 67, 68, 83, 84, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 118, 119, 120, 124, 125, 128, 133, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 146, 149, 163, 164, 165, 166, 191, 193, 196, 197, 212, 237, 286, 294, 300, 301, 302, 303, 325, 359, 364, 404.

H.O.W., p. 29, 30, 38, 64, 66, 78, 84, 94, 96, 113, 116, 364.

Immigration officers to carry out instructions received from S.C.O.s, p. 196.

Imperial Fascist League, p. 301.

Incitement to Disaffection Act, p. 74.

Index (carding policy), p. 40, 147, 174, 177, 329, 333, 336, 342.
 Industry & Commerce, p. 244, 249-257.
 Information Index, p. 199, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206.
 Information Section, p. 244, 288-293.
 Intelligence (straight), p. 3, 21, 85-91, 403.
 Intelligence, Directors of, p. 13, 19.
 Interception, see under 'Wireless', 'H.O.W.' etc.
 Internal organisation, p. 116, 118, 119.
 International Brigade, p. 50, 350.
 Internment of enemy aliens, p. 37, 295.
 Italian espionage) p. 20 and see contents sheet.
 Italian secret service)
 Italian fascism, see contents sheet and p. 11, 20, 22, 110-112, 115.
 Invasion of Normandy, p. 238, 239, 242, 243, 246, 269, 272, 273,
 281, 286, 322, 327, 328, 389, 398, 399, 400.
 Investigation Branch or Division(s), p. 34, 37.

 Japanese, aliens, p. 294.
 Japanese espionage) p. 20, 112-114, 360 et seq.
 Japanese secret service)
 J.I.C., p. 272, 287, 292, 311, 321, 322, 387.

 Kell, Sir Vernon, p. 9, 11, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 45, 66, 68, 78,
 101, 102, 119, 123, 136, 139.

 L.C.S. (London Controlling Section or cover plan staff), p. 229, 237,
 239.
 Leakage of information, p. 344, 382 et seq.
 Lenin, p. 6, 52, 54, 55, 162.
 Lenin school for espionage, p. 65, 71, 72.
 Liberty Restoration League, p. 304.
 Lights & Pigeons Section, p. 244, 282-285.
 L.R.C., p. 12, 13, 16, 158, 179, 180, 181, 182, 189, 193, 195,
 197, 198, 199-207, 223, 226, 236, 259, 288, 289, 292, 377, 378, 400.
 Ludendorff, p. 6, 43, 44.

 Machine tool industry, p. 125, 130, 253-256.
 Microphotography, p. 14, 275.
 Middle East Section, p. 244, 257-261.
 Military Control Officers, p. 40.
 Military Permit Officers, p. 40.
 Military security, p. 310, 336.
 Missert, p. 303, 306.

 National Socialist League, p. 301.
 Nazis) p. 2, 6, 11, 20, 22, 44, 115, 118, 121, 125, 130, 135,
 Nazism) 143, 250, 300, 307, 390, 403 and see contents sheet.
 Neutral Territories Sections, p. 244, 257.
 Nicolai, Colonel, p. 5, 41, 42, 43, 91.
 Normandy, see invasion of.
 NSDAP, see Nazis.
 Nuntia Bureau, p. 46.

 Official Secrets Act, p. 3, 27, 29, 101.
 Operational staffs, p. 14.
 O.S.S., see Americans, liaison with.
 Ostdienst, p. 45.
 Overlord, see invasion of Normandy.

 Pan-Pacific Trades Union Secretariat, p. 70, 71.
 Petrie, Sir David, p. 119, 160, 173, 177, 178, 399.
 Plan Fortitude, p. 238, 239.
 Polish Intelligence, liaison with, p. 138.
 Post Office, p. 27, 29, 116, 155, 364.

Preventive action) p. 34, 35, 37, 99, 306 et seq.,
Preventive Branch or Division) 336.
Prime Minister, p. 5, 21, 91, 100, 145, 242, 273, 346.
Prosecutions, p. 381 et seq., 386.
Public utilities, security of, p. 114.

Quisling, p. 6, 303, 306.

Railways, security of, p. 114.
Regional Control, p. 323 et seq.
Registration of aliens, p. 30.
Registry, relationship between Security Service & S.I.S. records,
p. 73, 350, 401.
Revolutionary defeatism, p. 49.
Revolutionary work in the Armed Forces, p. 53, 54, 58, 59, 61,
73, 74.
Right Club, p. 301, 391.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, p. 82.
RSHA, p. 181, 182, 183, 186, 214, 236, 329, 330, 331, 335.
R.S.L.O., p. 14, 151, 152, 205, 222, 284, 303, 324 et seq.,
368, 384.
R.S.S., p. 17, 18, 116, 117, 137, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 174,
182, 183, 185, 186, 236, 244, 276, 278, 282, 285, 286, 287, 291,
326, 329, 334, 351, 353, 361, 377, 400.
Rule of law, p. 2.
Russian espionage, see contents sheet and p. 8, 391.
Russian Revolution, p. 8, 46 et seq.
Russian Secret Police, p. 14.

Sabotage, p. 6, 14, 39, 46, 128, 129, 181, 213-227, 379.
Scientific work, p. 365.
Seamen and personnel of air lines, p. 244, 248-249, 298.
Security Control Officers, p. 193 et seq., 306, 314 et seq., 324,
325, 327.
Security Executive, p. 145 et seq., 302, 311, 346, 398.
Security Intelligence Centre, p. 119.
Security Service, new title of, 67, 68.
Shadowing, p. 63, 64, 244, 293.
Shipping, security of, p. 128.
Signals Security Section, p. 244, 285-288.
S.I.S., relations with, throughout, but see contents sheet.
S.O.E., p. 205, 219, 348, 365, 366, 377, 378, 388.
Soviet, significance of, p. 56.
Spain, Portugal & S. America Section, p. 244, 261-264.
Stalin, p. 47, 55, 62, 171, 172.
Staff, see strength of.
Strength of Staff, p. 28, 29, 32, 66, 114, 115, 119, 147, 207,
213, 317, 318, 336, 337, 367-370, 394, 395.
Swinton, Lord, p. 10, 119, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 154, 159,
160, 173, 177, 196, 282, 381.

Telephone, interception, p. 116, 245, 365.

'Total' war, p. 44.
Travel control, p. 33, 40, 125, 131, 193-199, 336.
Treachery Act, p. 3.
Trotsky, p. 48, 52, 53, 55, 61, 62, 350, 358 et seq.
Twenty (XX) Committee, p. 13, 230, 237.

Ueberseedienst, p. 45.

Vetting, p. 35, 115, 136, 306, 319.

War Book, the Government, p. 123.
War Book, War Office, p. 123.
War Emergency Legislation Committee, p. 123.
War Office, see Directorate of Military Operations and of
Military Intelligence.
Warrants, p. 12.
War Room, p. 223, 243, 293, 328 et seq., 375, 400.
W. Board, p. 13, 237.
W. Branch, p. 148, 150, 157, 387.
Wireless, interception, p. 116, 125, 154, 156, 174, 179, 180,
181, 182-193, 206, 212, 217, 228, 236, 237, 238, 259, 268, 269,
270, 271, 276-281, 289, 292, 293, 350 et seq.
Wirtschaftsdienst, p. 45.
Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft, p. 45.
Women officers, p. 369.

